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Household Debt Revaluation and the Real Economy: Evidence from a Foreign Currency Debt Crisis

American Economic Review 2020 110(9), 2667-2702
We examine the consequences of a sudden increase in household debt burdens by exploiting variation in exposure to household foreign currency debt during Hungary’s late-2008 currency crisis. The revaluation of debt burdens causes higher default rates and a collapse in spending. These responses lead to a worse local recession, driven by a decline in local demand, and negative spillover effects on nearby borrowers without foreign currency debt. The estimates translate into an output multiplier on higher debt service of 1.67. The impact of debt revaluation is particularly severe when foreign currency debt is concentrated on household, rather than firm, balance sheets. (JEL E21, E32, F34, G51)

How Does Credit Supply Expansion Affect the Real Economy? The Productive Capacity and Household Demand Channels

Journal of Finance 2020 75(2), 949-994 open access
ABSTRACT Credit supply expansion can affect an economy by increasing productive capacity or by boosting household demand. In this study, we develop a test to determine if the household demand channel is present, and we implement the test using both a natural experiment in the United States in the 1980s and an international panel of 56 countries over the last several decades. Consistent with the importance of the household demand channel, we find that credit supply expansion boosts nontradable sector employment and the price of nontradable goods, with limited effects on tradable sector employment. Such credit expansions amplify the business cycle and lead to more severe recessions.

Banking Crises Without Panics*

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2020 136(1), 51-113 open access
Abstract We examine historical banking crises through the lens of bank equity declines, which cover a broad sample of episodes of banking distress with and without banking panics. To do this, we construct a new data set on bank equity returns and narrative information on banking panics for 46 countries over the period of 1870 to 2016. We find that even in the absence of panics, large bank equity declines are associated with substantial credit contractions and output gaps. Although panics are an important amplification mechanism, our results indicate that panics are not necessary for banking crises to have severe economic consequences. Furthermore, panics tend to be preceded by large bank equity declines, suggesting that panics are the result, rather than the cause, of earlier bank losses. We use bank equity returns to uncover a number of forgotten historical banking crises and create a banking crisis chronology that distinguishes between bank equity losses and panics.