We analyze the impact of the Dodd–Frank Act on the shareholder wealth gains using a sample of 640 completed U.S. M&As announced between 1990 and 2014. Our results indicate a positive DFA effect on announcement period abnormal returns in small bank mergers. In fact, mergers with combined firm assets of less than $10 billion create more shareholder value after the DFA, than ever before. This positive announcement effect in small deals appears to be linked with merger-related compliance cost savings and profitability improvements. By examining long-run abnormal returns, we find that the documented DFA effect on small deals announcement abnormal returns does not disappear overtime. Finally, we do not find such effects for non-U.S. bank M&As over the same period.

In this study, we examine the relationship between firm-level political risk and stock price crash risk. Using a broad dataset of 4230 U.S. firms, 38,097 firm-year observations from 2002 to 2019, we reveal a positive association between political risk and stock price crash risk. These findings are robust to several model specifications and endogeneity checks. By using the Brexit referendum as a quasi-natural experiment, we provide evidence of a causal relationship between political risk and crash risk. Through channel analysis, we identify that this relationship is mediated via higher idiosyncratic volatility, lower price informativeness, and higher distress risk. We also find that our results are more pronounced in intangible-intensive firms. Interestingly, we show that managers of these firms respond to political risk by engaging in bad news hoarding. Finally, strong (external or internal) corporate governance mechanisms can moderate the positive relationship between political risk and stock price crash risk.

This study investigates the relationship between the culture of secrecy and stock price comovement using a large sample of firms in 49 countries over the period 1990 to 2019. We find that stock prices in secretive societies comove more than stock prices in less secretive societies. This higher comovement occurs primarily because idiosyncratic volatility is lower. We attribute this finding to cultural biases in secretive societies which deter investors’ information-seeking behavior. To support these conjectures, we provide evidence of stronger mean reversals (less informed trading) in these societies. Our results persist when we account for cross-country differences in firms’ liquidity and information asymmetry, and when we control for cash flow uncertainty. Finally, the enforcement of insider trading laws in secretive countries is associated with less privately informed trading and lower idiosyncratic volatility.