The portfolio selection problem is traditionally modelled by two different approaches. The first one is based on an axiomatic model of risk-averse preferences, where decision makers are assumed to possess a utility function and the portfolio choice consists in maximizing the expected utility over the set of feasible portfolios. The second approach, first proposed by Markowitz is very intuitive and reduces the portfolio choice to a set of two criteria, reward and risk, with possible tradeoff analysis. Usually the reward–risk model is not consistent with the first approach, even when the decision is independent from the specific form of the risk-averse expected utility function, i.e. when one investment dominates another one by second-order stochastic dominance. In this paper we generalize the reward–risk model for portfolio selection. We define reward measures and risk measures by giving a set of properties these measures should satisfy. One of these properties will be the consistency with second-order stochastic dominance, to obtain a link with the expected utility portfolio selection. We characterize reward and risk measures and we discuss the implication for portfolio selection.

Starting from the reward-risk model for portfolio selection introduced in De Giorgi (2005), we derive the reward-risk Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) analogously to the classical mean-variance CAPM. In contrast to the mean-variance model, reward-risk portfolio selection arises from an axiomatic definition of reward and risk measures based on a few basic principles, including consistency with second-order stochastic dominance. With complete markets, we show that at any financial market equilibrium, reward-risk investors' optimal allocations are comonotonic and, therefore, our model reduces to a representative investor model. Moreover, the pricing kernel is an explicitly given, non-increasing function of the market portfolio return, reflecting the representative investor's risk attitude. Finally, an empirical application shows that the reward-risk CAPM captures the cross section of U.S. stock returns better than the mean-variance CAPM does.

We develop a multivariate dynamic term structure model, which takes into account the nonlinear (time-varying) relation between interest rates and the state of the economy. In contrast to the classical term structure literature, in which nonlinearities are captured by increasing the number of latent state variables or by latent regime shifts, in our no-arbitrage framework the regimes are governed by thresholds and are directly linked to economic fundamentals. Specifically, starting from a simple monetary policy model for the short rate, we introduce a parsimonious and tractable model for the yield curve, which takes into account the possibility of regime shifts in the behavior of the Federal Reserve. In our empirical analysis, we show the merit of our approach three dimensions: interpretable bond dynamics, accurate short end yield curve pricing, and yield curve implications.

We provide theoretical and empirical arguments in favor of a diminishing marginal premium for market risk. In capital market equilibrium with binding portfolio restrictions, investors with different risk aversion levels generally hold different sets of risky securities. Whereas the traditional linear relation breaks down, equilibrium can be described or approximated by a concave relation between expected return and market beta, and a concave relationship between market alpha and market beta. An empirical analysis of U.S. stock market data confirms the existence of a significant concave cross-sectional relation between average return and estimated market beta. We estimate that the market risk premium is at least four to six percent per annum, substantially above traditional estimates. A practical implication for active portfolio managers is that the alpha of “betting against beta” strategies seems dominated by the medium-minus-high-beta spread rather than the low-minus-medium-beta spread. The success of such strategies thus largely depends on underweighting or short selling high-beta stocks.