We are the first to study the interplay between corporate diversification and debt maturity, both theoretically and empirically. Our models predict that diversification mitigates the debt-overhang problem, making long-term debt more attractive in the presence of rollover costs. Using data on 30,135 firms from 1978 to 2022, we find that multi-division firms have debt maturities at least 1 year longer than stand-alone firms, especially when facing debt overhang. Consistent with our predictions, the excess value of Berger and Ofek (1995) and Mansi and Reeb (2002) increases with debt maturity, suggesting that traditional measures of the diversification discount could be misleading.

We investigate the impact of corporate diversification on stock risk. For identification, we exploit an exogenous shock on volatility expectations related to COVID-19 lockdowns resulting in a period of high volatility. We show that firms that diversify only internationally experience a lower post-shock increase in daily volatility. However, diversifying only by business segment leads to a higher increase in post-shock daily volatility. Our main results are robust to different proxies for international and business diversification and daily volatility. Overall, these findings provide a more nuanced picture of the potential impact of corporate diversification on stock risk.

We investigate the role of CEO power and government monitoring on bank dividend policy for a sample of 109 European listed banks for the period 2005–2013. We employ three main proxies for CEO power: CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and unforced CEO turnover. We show that CEO power has a negative impact on dividend payout ratios and on performance, suggesting that entrenched CEOs do not have the incentive to increase payout ratios to discourage monitoring from minority shareholders. Stronger internal monitoring by board of directors, as proxied by larger ownership stakes of the board members, increases performance but decreases payout ratios. These findings are contrary to those from the entrenchment literature for non-financial firms. Government ownership and the presence of a government official on the board of directors of the bank, also reduces payout ratios, in line with the view that government is incentivized to favor the interest of bank creditors before the interest of minority shareholders. These results show that government regulators are mainly concerned about bank safety and this allows powerful CEOs to distribute low payouts at the expense of minority shareholders.

We are the first to examine the impact of gender diversity on banks' boards on the probability and size of public bailouts. Our findings, based on a sample of listed European banks over the period 2005–2017, suggest that banks with more gender-diverse boards are less likely to receive a public bailout and receive a lower amount of bailout funds as a percentage of total assets than banks with less gender-diverse boards. Specifically, an increase by one standard deviation in gender diversity decreases the probability of a bailout by at least 2.44%, a significant reduction considering that the unconditional probability is 18.7%. Gender diversity is also positively related to bank performance, as proxied by ROA and Tobin's Q and with dividend payout ratios, consistent with the hypothesis that female directors are better monitors than male directors. These results are robust to a variety of econometric approaches and provide support for recent reforms in several EU countries regarding gender quotas.

We measure market reactions to announcements concerning liquidity regulation, a key innovation in the Basel framework. Our initial results show that liquidity regulation attracts negative abnormal returns. However, the price responses are less pronounced when coinciding announcements concerning capital regulation are backed out, suggesting that markets do not consider liquidity regulation to be binding. Bank- and country-specific characteristics also matter. Liquid balance sheets and high charter values increase abnormal returns whereas smaller long-term funding mismatches reduce abnormal returns. Banks located in countries with large government debt and tight interbank conditions or with prior domestic liquidity regulation display lower abnormal returns.

We present a novel way to examine macro-financial linkages by focusing on the real effects of bank supervisors’ enforcement actions. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in supervisory monitoring intensity, we show that enforcement actions in single-market banks trigger temporarily large adverse effects for the macroeconomy by reducing personal income growth, the number of establishments, and increasing unemployment. These effects are related to contractions in bank lending and liquidity creation, and are more pronounced when we consider enforcement actions on both single-market and multi-market banks, and in counties with fewer banks and greater external financial dependence.

We investigate how investors perceive the adoption of the expected-loss model (ELM) for impairment incorporated in IFRS 9. Using a sample of European listed banks covering the period of the standard-setting process of IFRS 9, we examine whether the market perceives the new regulation to increase shareholder wealth. First, we document a positive market reaction to the ELM adoption events. Second, we find that investors perceive that the potential benefits of ELM are more pronounced for larger banks, banks with lower profitability and higher systemic risk, and for those that received a public bailout and with more positively skewed returns. Overall, these results support a “monitoring” channel suggesting that ELM may lead to greater bank transparency and more effective market discipline, fundamental for improving financial stability.

Following a natural disaster, the rate of economic growth recovers faster in less competitive banking markets. A 10% reduction in competition increases the rate of economic growth by 0.3%. In less competitive markets, banks respond to a disaster by increasing the supply of real estate credit by refinancing mortgage loans, but do not lend more to businesses or consumers. Instead, government agencies provide disaster loans to affected businesses and households. Smaller, profitable and well-capitalized institutions that rely more on traditional retail banking originate most mortgage credit.

We exploit exogenous legislative changes that alter the priority structure of different classes of debt to study how debtholder monitoring incentives affect bank earnings opacity. We present novel evidence that exposing nondepositors to greater losses in bankruptcy reduces earnings opacity, especially for banks with larger shares of nondeposit funding, listed banks, and independent banks. The reduction in earnings opacity is driven by a lower propensity to overstate earnings and is more pronounced among larger banks and in banks with more real estate loan exposure. Our findings highlight the importance of creditors’ monitoring incentives in improving the quality of information disclosure.

We examine the impact of Federal Reserve stress tests from 2009 to 2016 on U.S. bank liquidity creation. Empirical results show that regulatory stress tests have a negative effect on both on-and off-balance sheet bank liquidity creation and asset-side liquidity creation. As banks enter the stress tests, they reduce their liquidity creation to avoid failing the stress tests. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that banks manage their risk exposures to meet higher capital requirements. The negative effect of stress testing on liquidity creation continues to persist in the quarters after the stress tests. Finally, stress test banks appear to increase liability-side liquidity creation. These findings highlight that the enhanced financial stability from greater regulatory scrutiny may be achieved at the expense of financial intermediation.