This paper proposes a dynamic model of the optimal choices of a bank that benefits from market power and takes into account the impact of the deposit generation process. Interbank lending/borrowing emerges as a buffer that assists the bank in smoothing intertemporal adjustments in interdependent loan and deposit choices. The bank smooths the impact of interest-rates shocks on its customers to minimize the adjustments over time of the stocks of deposits and loans. It does not, however, provide insurance against negative shocks of real origin that increase its expected default costs. The predictions of the model help to shed light on the available empirical evidence and to analyze some recent developments of the banking industry.

We analyze the interaction among market competition, capital regulation, fixed regulatory compliance costs, and the portfolio and monitoring decisions of banks. We examine how the interplay among the effects of changes in the degree of competition and capital requirements regulation influence optimal bank choices and market outcomes. Furthermore, we evaluate how ratcheting up the Basel regulatory regime is likely to influence both the competitive structure of banking markets and the overall quality of bank loans. Higher capital requirements and increased fixed costs reduce the degree of competition in banking markets. The weight of these changes can fall more heavily on banks that choose to expend resources to monitor their loans to address loan losses.