This paper develops a model of regulated Brownian motion with an endogenous profit term to analyze the role of regulatory credibility on the stability and productivity of the banking system. We show that when regulatory intervention is perfect and costless, the volatility of the system can be substantially reduced with no loss of productivity. In fact, perfect credibility can actually reduce the volatility of intrinsically risky banking systems below the volatility of intrinsically less risky systems as banks anticipate intervention and mitigate their investment behaviour accordingly. However, when the credibility of the regime is weakened because of increased uncertainty stemming from regulation, such as random costs or imperfect timing of regulatory intervention, both the stability and productivity of the financial system are impaired. Importantly, we find that in the presence of regulatory costs and imperfect credibility, there is no universal optimal intervention policy rule. The optimal regulatory system depends on the regulator’s level of absolute risk aversion.

This paper investigates the explanatory and forecasting power of macroeconomic fundamentals on emerging market sovereign credit spreads. We pay special attention to a new set of macroeconomic factors related to market values that reflect investor expectations concerning future economic performance. The model we propose captures a significant part of the empirical variation in spreads. Importantly, it also includes a powerful forecasting component that extends up to 12 months outside the sample period. The forward-looking variables that we construct are significant and complement and enhance the explanatory content of the conventional variables found in the extant literature.

In this paper, we construct zero cost portfolios based on second and third degree stochastic dominance and show that they produce systematic, statistically significant, abnormal returns. These returns are robust with respect to the single index CAPM, the Fama-French three-factor model, the Carhart four-factor model, and the liquidity five-factor model. They are also robust with respect to momentum portfolios, transactions costs, varying time periods, and when broken down by a range of risk factors, such as firm size, leverage, age, return volatility, cash flow volatility, and trading volume.

Stochastic dominance is a more general approach to expected utility maximization than the widely accepted mean–variance analysis. However, when applied to portfolios of assets, stochastic dominance rules become too complicated for meaningful empirical analysis, and, thus, its practical relevance has been difficult to establish. This paper develops a framework based on the concept of Marginal Conditional Stochastic Dominance (MCSD), introduced by Shalit and Yitzhaki (1994), to test for the first time the relationship between second order stochastic dominance (SSD) and stock returns. We find evidence that MCSD is a significant determinant of stock returns. Our results are robust with respect to the most popular pricing models.

The empirical mean–variance evidence comparing the performance of Socially Responsible Investments (SRI) and conventional investments suggests that there is no significant difference between the two. This paper re-examines the problem in the context of Marginal Conditional Stochastic Dominance (MCSD), which can accommodate any return distribution or concave utility function. Our results provide strong evidence that there is a financial price to be paid for socially responsible investing. Indices composed of socially responsible firms are MCSD dominated by trademarked indices composed of conventional firms as well as by indices carefully matched by size and industry with the firms in the SRI indices. Zero cost portfolios created by shorting the SRI index and using the proceeds to invest in the conventional index generate higher average returns, lower variance and higher skewness than either of the two indices standing alone. They also MCSD dominate the SRI and conventional indices standing alone.