Logit and probit models of turnover=f(performance, firm type, firm type*performance, controls) are often used when testing whether turnover is “more sensitive to performance” for different types of firms. Researchers using this specification typically focus on the significance of the interaction term coefficient. If the intent is to show that the likelihood (rather than the odds) of turnover changes by more for one type of firm as performance varies, then this is an inappropriate test. Simulations are used to demonstrate how focusing on this particular coefficient can generate incorrect inferences. I then show how analyzing marginal effects eliminates this inference problem.

We analyze a large sample of US corporate bond tender offers to understand what affects tender premiums as well as the percentage of bonds tendered. For the average (median) tender offer, the tender price is 5.55% (3.24%) greater than the pre-tender market price while the percentage of bonds tendered is 82.3% (94.6%). Premiums offered by firms are greater when the firm is simultaneously soliciting consents to amend restrictive covenants and when the bond has a greater number of restrictive covenants. Premiums are also greater when long-term risk-free yields are low and the yield curve is flatter – conditions where a firm might want to lock in favorable long-term rates by issuing new debt and retiring old debt. Bondholders respond to higher tender premiums by tendering a greater percentage of their bonds – a 1% increase in tender premium increases the tendering rate by approximately 9%. Bondholders also tender a greater percentage of bonds possessing less desirable characteristics such as a short remaining maturity or bonds that are simultaneously undergoing consent solicitations. Finally, we find that tender offers are easier to complete when bond ownership concentration is greater.