Generally accepted auditing standards, auditing textbooks, and firm audit manuals indicate that, other things equal, the presence of significant monetary incentives based on financial results increases the inherent risk of material misstatement, and higher inherent risk should ordinarily cause the auditor to exercise a heightened degree of professional skepticism in conducting the audit. This article addresses the following basic research question: Are auditors sensitive to management's incentives to manage earnings? Research that examines whether auditors distinguish between explanations provided by managers with different incentives is important because audit standards indicate that inquiry of management can assist the auditor in evaluating significant unexpected differences. Two experiments were conducted. The first experiment explored whether management‐buyout‐induced incentives to make income‐decreasing accruals affect auditors' judgments of the probability that a material misstatement exists. As predicted, auditors were sensitive to these incentives. The second experiment explored whether bonus‐induced incentives affect auditors' judgments of the probability that a material misstatement exists. The auditors agreed that bonus plans such as the one in the experiment create incentives for management to make income‐increasing or income‐decreasing accruals depending on the terms of the plan. However, the auditors' judgments were unaffected by whether the unexpected difference and management's incentives were congruent. The auditors opted for potential audit effectiveness rather than potential audit efficiency by assuming that—on balance—management had incentives congruent with the unexpected overstatement. Résumé. Selon les normes de vérification généralement reconnues, les manuels de vérification et les guides de vérification des cabinets comptables, toutes choses égales par ailleurs, la présence d'encouragements monétaires substantiels basés sur les résultats financiers accroît le risque inhérent d'inexactitudes importantes, et un risque inhérent supérieur doit normalement amener le vérificateur à exercer davantage de vigilance dans la réalisation de sa mission de vérification. L'auteur s'intéresse à la question fondamentale suivante: les vérificateurs sont‐ils sensibles aux motivations de la direction à user d'astuces comptables aux fins de l'établissement des bénéfices? Les recherches visant à déterminer si les vérificateurs établissent une distinction entre les explications fournies par les gestionnaires dont les motivations sont différentes revêtent beaucoup d'importance, compte tenu du fait que les normes de vérification indiquent que les demandes de renseignements de la direction peuvent aider le vérificateur à évaluer les écarts inattendus appréciables. Deux expériences ont été menées. La première avait pour but de déterminer si les motivations à agir sur les comptes de régularisation de manière à réduire les bénéfices, induites par un rachat de l'entreprise par les cadres, ont une incidence sur les jugements des vérificateurs relatifs à la probabilité d'inexactitudes importantes dans les déclarations. Conformément aux prévisions, les vérificateurs se montrent sensibles à ces motivations. La seconde expérience visait à déterminer si les motivations induites par les primes ont une incidence sur les jugements des vérificateurs en ce qui a trait à la probabilité de l'existence d'inexactitudes importantes. Les vérificateurs conviennent que les systèmes de primes, comme celui de la seconde expérience, motivent la direction à agir sur les comptes de régularisation de façon à augmenter ou réduire les bénéfices, selon les conditions du système. Toutefois, les jugements des vérificateurs ne sont pas influencés par le fait que l'écart inattendu dans les bénéfices et la motivation de la direction sont reliés. Les vérificateurs optent pour l'efficacité potentielle de la vérification plutôt que pour son efficience potentielle, en supposant que, dans l'ensemble, la direction présente des motivations qui vont dans le sens des surestimations inattendues en matière de bénéfices.

Auditing, Source reliability, Auditor judgment

Analytical procedures have become an increasingly important part of financial statement auditing over the last 10 years. First recommended for audits by the Auditing Standards Board in 1978, analytical procedures are mandated for planning and overall review purposes by Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 56. In response to increased concerns about audit efficiency and effectiveness, analytical procedures are increasingly being used in place of and as a supplement to substantive tests of details. Despite their increased use, little is known about how analytical procedures are performed in practice. The purpose of this study is to describe how auditors perform analytical procedures at the planning, substantive testing, and overall review stages of the audit. To accomplish this, we conducted a series of interviews with 36 audit professionals at various levels of experience and responsibility (i.e., seniors, managers, and partners) representing all the U.S. Big Six accounting firms. The contributions of our study are threefold. First, by contributing to a more complete understanding of how analytical procedures are performed, we provide the basis for accounting researchers to identify current analytical procedure problems/issues and, thus, perform more relevant research. Second, we provide the Auditing Standards Board members with relevant information about current practice for their deliberations on revised guidance for analytical procedures. Third, we provide educators with a characterization of analytical procedures as performed in practice, thereby facilitating their classroom coverage of this important topic. Résumé. Depuis une dizaine d'années, les procédés analytiques jouent un rôle de plus en plus important dans la vérification des états financiers. D'abord recommandés en 1978 par l'Auditing Standards Board pour les vérifications, les procédés analytiques sont exigés par le Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) n° 56 pour la planification et l'examen global. Compte tenu des préoccupations accrues que soulèvent l'efficience et l'efficacité de la vérification, l'on fait de plus en plus appel aux procédés analytiques en remplacement et en complément des procédés de corroboration détaillés. Malgré cette utilisation croissante, le mode d'application concrète des procédés analytiques est peu connu. Les auteurs se sont donné pour but de décrire comment les vérificateurs appliquent les procédés analytiques aux étapes de planification, d'application des procédés de corroboration et d'examen global de la vérification. Pour y parvenir, ils ont procédé à une série d'entrevues avec 36 experts de la vérification possédant divers degrés d'expérience et assumant divers niveaux de responsabilités (premiers vérificateurs, chefs de groupe et associés), qui représentaient les six principaux cabinets d'experts comptables des États‐Unis. L'étude contribue à l'avancement des connaissances de trois façons. Premièrement, en permettant de mieux comprendre comment les procédés analytiques sont appliqués, elle munit les chercheurs en comptabilité des éléments nécessaires au diagnostic des problèmes ou des questions actuellement soulevés par les procédés analytiques et, partant, à la réalisation de travaux de recherche plus pertinents. Deuxièmement, elle offre aux membres de l'Auditing Standards Board de l'information pertinente relative aux méthodes courantes afin d'alimenter les délibérations relatives à l'orientation à donner aux procédés analytiques. Troisièmement, elle munit les enseignants d'une définition des procédés analytiques tels qu'ils sont appliqués concrètement, ce qui facilitera l'étude de cette importante question en classe.

D. Eric Hirst, Patrick E. Hopkins, Comprehensive Income Reporting and Analysts' Valuation Judgments, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 36, Studies on Enhancing the Financial Reporting Model (1998), pp. 47-75

Analysts, Analysts reports, Investor behavior

An important problem facing managers is how to enhance the credibility, or believability, of their earnings forecasts. In this paper, we experimentally test whether a characteristic of a management earnings forecast—namely, whether it is disaggregated—can affect its credibility. We also test whether disaggregation moderates the relation between managerial incentives and forecast credibility. Disaggregated forecasts include an earnings forecast as well as forecasts of other key line items comprising that earnings forecast. Our results indicate that disaggregated forecasts are judged to be more credible than aggregated ones and that disaggregation works to counteract the effect of high incentives. We also develop and test an original model that explains how disaggregation positively impacts three factors that, in turn, influence forecast credibility: perceived precision of management's beliefs, perceived clarity of the forecast, and perceived financial reporting quality. We show that forecast disaggregation works to remedy incentive problems only via its effect on perceived financial reporting quality. Overall, our study adds to our understanding of how managers can credibly communicate their expectations about the future to market participants.

D. Eric Hirst, Lisa Koonce, Jeffrey Miller, The Joint Effect of Management's Prior Forecast Accuracy and the Form of Its Financial Forecasts on Investor Judgment, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 37, Studies on Credible Financial Reporting (1999), pp. 101-124

Several researchers (e.g., Lundholm 1999; Ryan 1997; Petroni, Ryan, and Wahlen 2000) have proposed a reporting mechanism to enhance the reliability of estimates and other forward‐looking information in financial reports. Their proposals require companies to report reconciliations of prior‐year estimates to actual realizations as supplemental information in their financial reports. Such disclosures would enable investors to distinguish between accurate and opportunistic reporting behavior, and, arguably, should create incentives for companies to estimate accurately in the first place. Our study provides evidence on these proposals. Specifically, we conduct two experiments within the context of an important intangible asset requiring estimation ‐ software development costs. Our results show that the proposed reporting mechanism is effective in communicating information about the accuracy of financial estimates. We find, however, that not all disclosures are equally useful. The most effective disclosures explicitly describe the implications of misestimation (if any) on both the balance sheet and on earnings, thereby reducing the computational complexity associated with less explicit disclosures. Furthermore, our results show that when the disclosures explicitly describe the implications of misestimation, investors reward accurate estimators but do not explicitly punish those who are inaccurate. We conclude that information about previous estimate accuracy is useful to investors and that regulators should consider the type of disclosure, because not all disclosures may be equally effective in creating management incentives for accurate estimation. Moreover, the competitive advantage conferred on firms that provide accurate estimates arguably should create incentives for all companies to estimate accurately in the future.

We examine how fair-value-income measurement affects commercial bank equity analysts' risk and value judgments. Normatively, holding information and other underlying economics constant, bank analysts' risk and valuation assessments should distinguish between banks with different risks, but should not depend on how banks measure income. In our experiment, we vary income measurement—full-fair-value (all fair-value changes recognized in income) versus piecemeal-fair-value (some fair-value changes recognized in income, others disclosed in the notes). We also vary interest-rate-risk exposure (exposed versus hedged). We find that bank analysts' risk and value judgments distinguish banks' exposure to interest-rate risk only under full-fair-value-income measurement. Our evidence contributes to research concerned with financial performance reporting, risk, and fair-value accounting by demonstrating that differences in income measurement affect fundamental judgments of specialist analysts. Our findings are striking because they: (1) point toward an important role for measurement and recognition of fair-value gains and losses in income, and (2) suggest that note disclosure is not a substitute for financial-statement recognition (even for professional analysts specializing in banks and working in a context that involves assessment of core operations of a bank). These results should be of interest to accounting standard setters as they evaluate whether to require full-fair-value-income measurement.