How do investor reactions to the mandatory disclosure of firm tax information influence managers' reporting choices? To answer this question, we build a structural model of reporting bias, which we test with a unique data set of Turkish firms that have been mandated to publicly disclose their tax returns since 2009. We find that both book and tax income numbers are informative to investors. Structural estimates are consistent with disclosure of the tax report reducing both market incentives to manage book earnings and investor uncertainty about underlying firm value. Tax disclosure is associated with higher reported tax income, though the increase is not statistically significant. Counterfactual estimates suggest that book‐tax‐conformity could change financial and tax reporting biases, but lead to a lower quality information environment relative to the separate disclosure of book and tax reports.

We examine the choice of organizational structure for VC-backed startup firms. These firms overwhelmingly organize as C-corporations rather than as tax advantaged limited liability companies (LLCs). This results in foregone tax savings of $43.9 billion, or 4.9% of the total equity invested in the sample firms. The decision is puzzling, given plausible estimates of the direct costs involved, but appears related to “hassle” and other transition costs generated by participants implementing a new form. Firms with more employees and investors are likely to choose the C-corporation. VCs appear to prefer the C-corporation form, as receiving VC money is associated with most LLC firms switching to a C-corporation within 30 days. Greater VC preferences for C-corporations are linked to a preference for familiarity, and less attention to taxes.

We show that accruals consist of at least two distinct underlying processes, one with positive serial correlation and the other with negative serial correlation. We also find that the accrual reversals characterizing the negatively serially correlated process are predominantly good accruals that correctly anticipate fluctuations in working capital. Accrual estimation error is the least persistent component of earnings, while accruals relating to firm growth are less persistent than cash flows. Finally, the mispricing of accruals appears to be driven by a combination of accrual estimation error and firm growth.

Revenue-sharing contracts allow firms that are distant from their target markets to leverage sellers' local expertise. Although these contracts align incentives in operational decisions, they also introduce the potential for sellers to underreport revenues. We analyze film-level box office data from 7,309 Chinese cinemas and find that cinemas report significantly lower revenues for foreign films than for comparable domestic films, consistent with foreign producers being less able to monitor reported revenues due to geographic distance. The underreporting of foreign films is lower in cities with widespread mobile payments, in multi-unit cinemas, and when foreign films have more predictable revenues, suggesting institutional factors that increase detection likelihood can mitigate underreporting. Further tests indicate the lower reported box office revenues of foreign films is not due to government intervention. Our findings provide novel evidence of product-level misreporting under revenue-sharing contracts and offer insights on mitigating these risks in international markets. Data availability: Data are available via the sources specified in the paper. The authors greatly appreciate the data supplied by EntGroup (http://english.entgroup.com.cn/enbase.html) but are not able to share the data based on the agreement with Entgroup.