The goal of this paper is to link attitude toward risk over personal consumption with attitude toward risk over social consumptions. Because many everyday choices involve risk, these attitudes enter virtually every realm of individual decision-making. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for deducing preferences over risky social choices (which have consequences both for the Decision Maker and for others) from risky personal choices (which have consequences only for the Decision Maker) and riskless social choices, and we offer an experimental test of the theory. The experiments generate a rich dataset that enables completely non-parametric revealed preference tests of the theory at the level of the individual subject. Many subjects behave as predicted by the theory but a substantial fraction do not.

Choices involving risk significantly affect the distribution of income and wealth in society. This paper reports the results of the first experiment, to our knowledge, to study fairness views about risk-taking, specifically whether such views are based chiefly on ex ante opportunities or on ex post outcomes. We find that, even though many participants focus exclusively on ex ante opportunities, most favor some redistribution ex post. Many participants also make a distinction between ex post inequalities that reflect differences in luck and ex post inequalities that reflect differences in choices. These findings apply to both stakeholders and impartial spectators.

A core question in the contemporary debate on distributive justice is how to understand fairness in situations involving production. Important theories of distributive justice, such as strict egalitarianism, liberal egalitarianism, and libertarianism, provide different answers to this question. This paper presents the results from a dictator game where the distribution phase is preceded by a production phase. Each player's contribution is a result of a freely chosen investment level and an exogenously given rate of return. We estimate simultaneously the prevalence of three principles of distributive justice among the players and the distribution of the weight they attach to fairness.

This paper provides the first comprehensive global evidence on people’s fairness and efficiency preferences, beliefs about the sources of inequality and the efficiency cost of redistribution, and policy attitudes toward redistribution. Using a globally harmonized consequential experiment with more than 65,000 individuals across 60 countries, we show that the source of inequality plays a substantially larger role for inequality acceptance than the efficiency cost of redistribution. At the global level, implemented inequality increases by 85 percent when inequality is caused by merit rather than luck, compared to a 14 percent increase when redistribution entails a 50 percent efficiency cost. We document substantial heterogeneity in fairness views and beliefs both within and across societies. The meritocratic fairness view is most prominent in many richer Western societies, while libertarian and egalitarian fairness views are widespread in many other parts of the world. Globally, people are more likely to believe that inequality reflects luck rather than merit, while beliefs in large efficiency costs of redistribution are relatively weak. Fairness preferences and beliefs are strongly associated with redistribution attitudes and actual redistribution through taxes and transfers across countries. Our findings illustrate how the interaction between fairness views and beliefs may shape redistribution across societies, highlighting the importance of jointly understanding preferences and beliefs in the political economy of redistribution.

The principle that people should be held personally responsible for the consequences of their choices is a fundamental moral ideal in Western societies. We report from a large-scale experimental study of how far-reaching this principle is for inequality acceptance. We show that third-party spectators violate minimal conditions for a morally relevant choice when making redistributive decisions for two workers. They accept more inequality when the workers have made nominal and forced choices than when brute luck is the source of inequality. We argue that our findings shed light on important current political debates about personal responsibility and redistributive policies.

This paper investigates fairness perceptions of extreme income inequality generated in winner-take-all competitions. Two large-scale experiments with more than 7,000 participants from the general population of the U.S. show that extreme earnings inequality is widely accepted, even when the winner only slightly outperforms the runner-up. The effect of the winning margin on inequality acceptance is modest compared to the effect of shifting the source of inequality from luck to winning by the smallest possible margin. The experimental choices are systematically associated with broader fairness attitudes and policy preferences, including support for higher taxation of top earners and redistributive economic policy.

We exploit a unique data set, combining rich experimental data with high-quality administrative data, to study dropout from the college track in Norway, and why boys are more likely to drop out. The paper provides three main findings. First, we show that family background and personal characteristics contribute to explain dropout. Second, we show that the gender difference in dropout rates appears both when the adolescents select into the college track and after they have started. Third, we show that different processes guide the choices of the boys and the girls of whether to drop out from the college track.