We present a detailed view of market quality in the presence of preferencing arrangements. A unique dataset provides the opportunity to measure trading costs of marketable orders and fill rates and ex post costs of limit orders across trading venues. For market orders, we find the primary exchange provides the lowest execution costs. However, the preferencing exchanges are no worse than, and in most cases better than, the nonpreferencing regional exchanges. For limit orders, the regionals execute limit orders more frequently than the primary market and with an ex post execution cost that is not very different from the primary market.

This paper studies the flows of funds into and out of equity mutual funds. Consumers base their fund purchase decisions on prior performance information, but do so asymmetrically, investing disproportionately more in funds that performed very well the prior period. Search costs seem to be an important determinant of fund flows. High performance appears to be most salient for funds that exert higher marketing effort, as measured by higher fees. Flows are directly related to the size of the fund's complex as well as the current media attention received by the fund, which lower consumers' search costs.

This paper studies the flows of funds into and out of equity mutual funds. Consumers base their fund purchase decisions on prior performance information, but do so asymmetrically, investing disproportionately more in funds that performed very well the prior period. Search costs seem to be an important determinant of fund flows. High performance appears to be most salient for funds that exert higher marketing effort, as measured by higher fees. Flows are directly related to the size of the fund's complex as well as the current media attention received by the fund, which lower consumers' search costs.

Trading by corporate insiders and their tippees is analyzed in Anheuser-Busch's 1982 tender offer for Campbell Taggart. Court records that identify insider transactions are used to disentangle the individual insider trades from liquidity trades. Consistent with previous studies, insider trading was found to have had a significant impact on the price of Campbell Taggart. However, the impact of informed trading on the market is complicated. Trading volume net of insider purchases rose. Contrary to the broad implications of adverse selection models, Campbell Taggart's liquidity improved when the insiders were active in the market and all the insiders received superior execution for their orders.

ABSTRACT Trading by corporate insiders and their tippees is analyzed in Anheuser‐Busch's 1982 tender offer for Campbell Taggart. Court records that identify insider transactions are used to disentangle the individual insider trades from liquidity trades. Consistent with previous studies, insider trading was found to have had a significant impact on the price' of Campbell Taggart. However, the impact of informed trading on the market is complicated. Trading volume net of insider purchases rose. Contrary to the broad implications of adverse selection models, Campbell Taggart's liquidity improved when the insiders were active in the market, and the insiders received superior execution for their orders.

We provide empirical evidence on order submission strategy of investors with similar com-mitments to trade by comparing the execution costs of market orders and marketable limit orders (i.e., limit orders with the same trading priority as market orders). The results in-dicate the unconditional trading costs of marketable limit orders are significantly greater than market orders. We attribute the difference in costs to a selection bias and provide evidence suggesting the order submission strategy decision is based on prevailing market conditions and stock characteristics. After correcting for the selection bias, the results show the average trader chooses the order type with lower conditional trading costs. I.

[This article reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the impact of lastsale trade reporting on the liquidity of BBB corporate bonds. Overall, adding transparency has either a neutral or a positive effect on liquidity. Increased trans is not associated with greater trading volume. Except for very large trades, spreads on newly transparent bonds decline relative to bonds that experience no transparency change. However, we find no effect on spreads for very infrequently traded bonds. The observed decrease in transaction costs is consistent with investors' ability to negotiate better terms of trade once they have access to broader bond-pricing data.]

We present a detailed view of market quality in the presence of preferencing arrangements. A unique dataset provides the opportunity to measure trading costs of marketable orders and fill rates and ex post costs of limit orders across trading venues. For market orders, we find the primary exchange provides the lowest execution costs. However, the preferencing exchanges are no worse than, and in most cases better than, the nonpreferencing regional exchanges. For limit orders, the regionals execute limit orders more frequently than the primary market and with an ex post execution cost that is not very different from the primary market.

This article reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the impact of last-sale trade reporting on the liquidity of BBB corporate bonds. Overall, adding transparency has either a neutral or a positive effect on liquidity. Increased transparency is not associated with greater trading volume. Except for very large trades, spreads on newly transparent bonds decline relative to bonds that experience no transparency change. However, we find no effect on spreads for very infrequently traded bonds. The observed decrease in transaction costs is consistent with investors’ ability to negotiate better terms of trade once they have access to broader bond-pricing data. (JEL codes: G14, G18, G23, G24, G28)