A number of recent policy initiatives have called for enhanced transparency of banking firms. While the hope is that enhanced transparency may improve incentives ex ante, it is less clear whether transparency is necessarily a good thing ex post, when a bank might have hit hard times and provision of information could have a destabilising effect. This paper provides a synopsis of these different effects and provides some new, bank-level evidence in an attempt to clarify empirically whether, taking ex ante and ex post effects together, transparency is likely to reduce or increase bank stability. The analysis suggests that, on balance, transparency reduces the chance of severe banking problems and thus enhances overall financial stability.

Governments face conflicting objectives in terms of the provision and design of safety nets for banking systems. Safety nets may reduce market discipline and can thus increase the likelihood of a banking crisis. But safety nets are adopted because of the perceived benefits they will confer in either preventing a weak banking system from spilling over into a full-blown crisis or in enabling the government to handle a crisis more effectively. This paper provides evidence on the effects of government safety nets on both these aspects and discusses implications for policy.