The recent crisis highlighted the role of cross-border banking linkages. This paper analyzes these linkages through an examination of both banking systems’ foreign credit exposures and borrower countries’ reliance on foreign bank credit. It does this by combining BIS data with bank-level data. The results indicate that the proposed refinements on measuring those two exposures are important, especially when foreign bank affiliates’ funding relies heavily on local deposits. After developing novel and necessary break-in-series and exchange rate variation adjustments, estimations looking at the driving factors of both measures during 2006–2012 highlight: (i) the role of systemic banking crises and global financial conditions in the evolution of banks’ foreign credit exposures; (ii) the role of a larger set of factors in the case of the evolution of borrower countries’ reliance on foreign bank credit—how countries borrowed, from whom they borrowed, and global financial and domestic demand conditions.

The recent crisis has spurred the use of bank stress tests as a crisis management and early warning tool. However, a weakness is that current stress tests are based on consolidated balance sheets, and thus omit potential risks embedded in banking groups’ geographical structures by assuming that capital and liquidity are available wherever they are needed within the group. This study presents a framework to integrate ring fencing and regulatory differences (e.g., minimum capital requirements) into cross-border bank stress tests. Case studies show how some forms of ring fencing—home or host regulators limiting flows of capital and income within a group—could significantly increase banks’ capital needs.

International banks greatly reduced direct cross-border and local affiliates’ lending as the global financial crisis strained their balance sheets, lowered borrower demand, and altered government policies. Using bilateral lender–borrower data and controlling for demand, we show that reductions largely varied in line with markets’ prior assessments of banks’ vulnerabilities, with financial statements’ and lender–borrower data playing minor roles. Those banking systems subject to less market discipline, however, were less sensitive to markets’ perceptions. Moving resources within banking groups became more restricted as drivers of reductions in direct cross-border loans differed from those for local affiliates’ lending, especially for more impaired banking systems.

Chinese banks have become the largest cross-border creditors for almost half of all emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). While they look similar to other EMDE banks in terms of ownership and balance-sheet structure, their global cross-border lending resembles that of banks from advanced economies along several dimensions, especially when lending to EMDEs. We find that geographical distance poses a barrier for cross-border lending, including for Chinese banks. For them, given their network of affiliates, this barrier is lower than for other EMDE banks, more like US or European banks. We show that across all bank nationalities, bilateral economic interactions, like trade, FDI and portfolio investment, all positively correlate with cross-border lending. What stands out is that Chinese banks’ lending to EMDEs correlates more than any other nationality with trade, but there is no such correlation with FDI and, unlike all other banks, their lending correlates negatively with portfolio investment.

We examine the factors influencing international banks’ organizational form, using an original database on the operations in Latin America and Eastern Europe of the world’s top 100 banks. We find that banks are more likely to operate as branches in countries that have higher taxes and lower regulatory restrictions on bank entry and on foreign branches. Subsidiary operations are preferred by banks seeking to penetrate host markets by establishing large retail operations. Finally, economic and political risks have opposite effects, suggesting that legal differences in parent banks’ responsibilities associated with branches and subsidiaries are important determinants of banks’ organizational form.

This paper examines the association between the default risk of foreign bank subsidiaries in developing countries and their parents during the global financial crisis, with the purpose of determining the size and sign of this correlation and, more importantly, understanding what factors can help insulate affiliates from their parents. We find evidence of a significant and robust positive correlation between parent banks’ and foreign subsidiaries’ default risk. This correlation is lower for subsidiaries that have a higher share of retail deposit funding and that are more independently managed from their parents. Host country bank regulations are also associated with the extent to which shocks to the parents affect the subsidiaries’ default risk. In particular, the correlation between the default risk of subsidiaries and their parents is lower for subsidiaries operating in countries that impose higher capital, reserve, provisioning, and disclosure requirements, and tougher restrictions on bank activities.

Using a recent IMF survey and expanding on previous studies, we document the use of macroprudential policies for 119 countries over the 2000–2013 period, covering many instruments. Emerging economies use macroprudential policies most frequently; especially foreign exchange related ones while advanced countries use borrower-based policies more. Usage is generally associated with lower growth in credit, notably in household credit. Effects are less in financially more developed and open economies, however, and usage comes with greater cross-border borrowing, suggesting some avoidance. And while macroprudential policies can help manage financial cycles, they work less well in busts.