Auditing, Sampling, Sample Size, Sampling risk

We examine how an auditor assesses the risk of fraud and formulates an audit plan when the auditee has the opportunity to commit various types of fraud. Unlike previous studies, the audi‐tee can misappropriate assets (defalcation), misreport financial information (fraudulent financial reporting), or misreport financial information in combination with defalcation. Our results identify four possible equilibria whose characteristics depend on the auditee's relative rewards and penalties from the various types of fraud, the cost of audit effort, and expectations about the auditee‐firm's performance. When the cost of audit effort is sufficiently small, fraud risk assessment depends on the auditee's rewards and penalties associated with each type of fraud, but not on the auditor's beliefs about firm performance. The auditor develops an audit plan that focuses on the type of fraud the auditee is most motivated to commit, and in turn, the audit plan deters all other types of fraud.

The concept of materiality provides a basis for auditors to ignore small misstatements, but the definition of “small” in this context is ambiguous. The issue of “materiality-standard-setting” has been raised recently by Arthur Levitt, former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. We examine how materiality uncertainty affects the auditor's evaluation of audit evidence and a manager's choice of earnings overstatement in a strategic auditing model where earnings misstatements also include unintentional system error. We find that when the expected cost of accepting financial statements that are materially misstated, which we refer to as an audit failure, is relatively large, an increase in materiality uncertainty results in a more conservative auditor evaluation of the audit evidence and a decrease in the amount of intentional overstatement. Alternatively, if the auditor's expected cost of extending audit procedures is relatively high, then an increase in materiality uncertainty results in a less conservative auditor evaluation of the audit evidence and an increase in the manager's earnings overstatement. The auditor also becomes increasingly conservative as the report increases when the information system is sufficiently noisy. Finally, when the expected cost of audit failure is large, the equilibrium audit risk can increase or decrease in materiality uncertainty despite the corresponding increase in auditor conservatism and decrease in intentional overstatement. Audit risk is the average probability of audit failure across all possible evidence outcomes.

We consider how auditors assess the risk of fraudulent financial reporting and plan their audit where a possibly fraudulent auditee anticipates the assessment and planning process. The auditor uses the auditee's (possibly fraudulent) earnings report to revise his beliefs about the likelihood of fraud when formulating an audit plan. We find that as underlying earnings increase, a fraudulent auditee increases reported earnings. In turn, as the auditee's reported earnings increase, the auditor increases audit effort. We also find that the auditee (who knows the auditor will use the report for audit planning) selects reports that increase his own expected payoff, relative to reports he would select if the auditor did not observe the report before finalizing the audit plan. By contrast, the auditor is no better off using the auditee's report for audit planning. Inherent risk, detection risk, and overall audit risk can increase when the auditor uses the auditee's report. Thus, because of the dynamic interaction between the auditor and auditee, procedures that aid in assessing audit risk may not reduce that risk or result in more efficient audits.

We provide a theoretical investigation of the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on auditing intensity and internal control strength. We propose a model of strategic auditing in which the auditor can use resources for both internal control tests and substantive tests, while the manager can choose the strength of internal controls and the amount of fraud. We find that control tests are a valuable tool for the auditor when control strength is informative about the likelihood of fraud. We find that Sarbanes-Oxley has the desired effect of inducing stronger internal control systems and less fraud, but does not necessarily induce higher levels of control testing. Our model suggests that audit risk increases as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

Since the passage of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002, many notable frauds have been tied to ineffective audit committee (AC) oversight. As a result, AC oversight is of continuing interest, and regulators continue to debate this issue, garnering a growing body of research focused on the role played by the AC. But little theoretical research exists to guide analytical and empirical researchers investigating AC oversight. The purpose of this study is to provide theoretical guidance by examining AC oversight in a strategic setting. We focus on the AC's role in overseeing internal controls (ICs) and the impact of whether the AC relies on management in designing the controls. We characterize how the nature of control risk changes and how IC strength is associated with the amount of managerial fraud, expected probability of fraud detection (which, on average, equates to audit effort), and audit quality (assessed as 1 − audit risk) across two settings defined by the degree of AC oversight. As one example that highlights the need for theoretical guidance, we consider the literature's presumption that IC strength is negatively associated with audit effort. We find that this association may be positive or negative as IC changes, where the association varies with the degree of direct AC oversight and the change in payoff parameters.

In this study, we provide theoretical guidance for both analytical research and empirical research by considering how changing expectations of earnings affect a dishonest manager's strategy to overstate earnings and an auditor's strategy to exert effort in a two‐period setting. We expect our study's insights on changing economic conditions to help shape future research. We model the manager type as either honest or dishonest, which allows us to differentiate audit risk from audit effort. The key takeaways for future research are the insights on how changes in payoffs and expected earnings affect the associations that involve earnings overstatements and audit effort with audit risk and market price. For instance, researchers typically assume audit effort and audit risk are negatively associated, but we find the association can be positive when, for example, the auditor chooses a period 2 strategy based on the changes in period 1 game parameters. The results of our study provide two additional key insights on the design of future empirical tests. First, by dichotomizing, we show the importance of estimating the intercept in the market pricing equation when studying earnings quality, because market price also adjusts for expected bias through changes in the intercept. Second, our multiperiod setting demonstrates that the effects from a change in the manager's or auditor's incentives in period 1 may reverse in period 2. Empirical studies typically examine the contemporaneous effects of these changes on market price and/or audit risk but fail to identify the cross‐temporal effects we document in our study.

Two distinct lines of research have been dedicated to empirically testing how financial reporting quality (measured as the earnings response coefficient or ERC) is associated with management's choice of reporting bias and with audit quality. However, researchers have yet to consider how ERCs are affected by either the auditor's reaction to changes in the manager's reporting bias or the manager's reaction to changes in audit quality. Our study provides theoretical guidance on these interrelations and how changes in the manager's or the auditor's incentives affect both reporting bias and audit quality. Specifically, when the manager's cost (benefit) of reporting bias increases (decreases), we find that expected bias decreases, inducing the auditor to react by reducing audit quality. Because we also find that the association between expected audit quality and ERCs is always positive, changes in managerial incentives for biased reporting lead to a positive association between ERCs and expected reporting bias. When the cost of auditing decreases or the cost of auditor liability increases, we find that expected audit quality increases, inducing the manager to react by decreasing reporting bias. In this case, changes in the costs of audit quality lead to a negative association between ERCs and expected reporting bias. Finally, we demonstrate the impact of our theoretical findings by focusing on the empirical observations documented in the extant literature on managerial ownership and accounting expertise on the audit committee. In light of our framework, we provide new interpretations of these empirical observations and new predictions for future research.

Protection of outside investors depends on the detection and punishment of resource diversion by corporate insiders, including managers and controlling shareholders. We focus on the role played in investor protection by self-interested auditors operating in a competitive audit market. In our setting, auditors represent the mechanism whereby detection of diversion occurs. We show that markets with relatively greater auditor penalties for audit failures and greater insider penalties for detected resource diversion have larger total investment levels, a higher proportion of the firm held by outsiders, higher audit resource investment, higher audit fees, and higher expected investment returns.