[We test whether the home bias in equity portfolios is caused by investors trying to hedge inflation risk. The empirical evidence is consistent with this motive only if investors have very high levels of risk tolerance and equity returns are negatively correlated with domestic inflation. We then develop a model of international portfolio choice and equity market equilibrium that integrates inflation risk and deadweight costs. Using this model we estimate the levels of costs required to generate the observed home bias in portfolios consistent with different levels of risk aversion. For a level of risk aversion consistent with standard estimates of the domestic equity market risk premium, these costs are about a few percent per annum, greater than observable costs such as withholding taxes. Thus, the home bias cannot be explained by either inflation hedging or direct observable costs of international investment unless investors have very low levels of risk aversion.]

[Using a large sample of cross-border mergers, we measure the effect of a change in location on systematic risk. When a target firm's location moves, a large part of its systematic risk switches from being related to its home equity market to that of the acquirer. On average, the change in betas is equivalent to an excess shift of about 0.5 in the target's beta from its home market to that of the acquirer. We test whether the change in systematic risk can be explained by fundamental factors related to changes in the operations of the firm or merger synergy and find that it cannot.]

We test whether the home bias in equity portfolios is caused by investors trying to hedge inflation risk. The empirical evidence is consistent with this motive only if investors have very high levels of risk tolerance and equity returns are negatively correlated with domestic inflation. We then develop a model of international portfolio choice and equity market equilibrium that integrates inflation risk and deadweight costs. Using this model we estimate the levels of costs required to generate the observed home bias in portfolios consistent with different levels of risk aversion. For a level of risk aversion consistent with standard estimates of the domestic equity market risk premium, these costs are about a few percent per annum, greater than observable costs such as withholding taxes. Thus, the home bias cannot be explained by either inflation hedging or direct observable costs of international investment unless investors have very low levels of risk aversion.

Richard A. Brealey, Ian A. Cooper, Evi Kaplanis; What is the International Dimension of International Finance?, European Finance Review, Volume 3, Issue 1,

Using a large sample of cross-border mergers, we measure the effect of a change in location on systematic risk. When a target firm's location moves, a large part of its systematic risk switches from being related to its home equity market to that of the acquirer. On average, the change in betas is equivalent to an excess shift of about 0.5 in the target's beta from its home market to that of the acquirer. We test whether the change in systematic risk can be explained by fundamental factors related to changes in the operations of the firm or merger synergy and find that it cannot. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected], Oxford University Press.

We examine changes in risk following US bank mergers in the period 1981–2014. Short-run increases in acquirer risk following mergers occur only in the first few mergers undertaken by the same acquirer, and only in systematic risk. The equity volatility of acquirers does not increase. Using a new approach to measure the long-run effect we find that these results persist, consistent with banks maintaining a constant level of total equity risk in the long run. Constant acquirer risk means that all diversification benefits of the mergers are dissipated. We measure the loss of diversification associated with mergers and find it to be 40% of the risk level in 1981. Almost all of this occurred prior to 2004. In addition, there has been a large increase in correlations between the largest banks, much of which has come from sources other than mergers. The results are inconsistent with these mergers being motivated by the ‘too big to fail’ put. They suggest that if one wanted to reduce the risk of the banking system by demerging major banks one would have to reach back to the structure that existed before 2004. Simply reversing recent mergers would not have much effect on stock market measures of risk.