[We conduct an analysis of the risk and return characteristics of a number of widely used fixed-income arbitrage strategies. We find that the strategies requiring more "intellectual capital" to implement tend to produce significant alphas after controlling for bond and equity market risk factors. These positive alphas remain significant even after taking into account typical hedge fund fees. In contrast with other hedge fund strategies, many of the fixed-income arbitrage strategies produce positively skewed returns. These results suggest that there may be more economic substance to fixedincome arbitrage than simply "picking up nickels in front of a steamroller."]

ABSTRACT We study an important recent series of buyback auctions conducted by the U.S. Treasury in retiring $67.5 billion of its illiquid off‐the‐run debt. The Treasury was successful in buying back large amounts of illiquid debt while suffering only a small market‐impact cost. The Treasury included the most‐illiquid bonds more frequently in the auctions, but tended to buy back the least‐illiquid of these bonds. Although the Treasury had the option to cherry pick from among the bonds offered, we find that the Treasury was actually penalized for being spread too thinly in the buybacks.

We conduct an analysis of the risk and return characteristics of a number of widely used fixed-income arbitrage strategies. We find that the strategies requiring more “intellectual capital” to implement tend to produce significant alphas after controlling for bond and equity market risk factors. These positive alphas remain significant even after taking into account typical hedge fund fees. In contrast with other hedge fund strategies, many of the fixed-income arbitrage strategies produce positively skewed returns. These results suggest that there may be more economic substance to fixed-income arbitrage than simply “picking up nickels in front of a steamroller.”