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Investment and Capital Market Imperfections: A Switching Regression Approach Using U.S. Firm Panel Data

The Review of Economics and Statistics 1998 80(3), 466-479
In this paper we develop a switching regression model of investment, in which the probability of a firm facing a high premium on external finance is endogenously determined. This approach allows one to address the potential problem of static and dynamic misclassification encountered where firms are sorted using a criteria chosen a priori. We use U.S. firm level data to analyze the effects of variables that capture each firm's credit worthiness, asymmetric information, and agency problems on the probability of being in the high- or low-premium regime. The role of macroeconomic conditions and monetary policy is also discussed.

Monetary Instability, the Predictability of Prices, and the Allocation of Investment: An Empirical Investigation Using U.K. Panel Data

American Economic Review 2001 91(3), 648-662
Monetary Instability, the Predictability of Prices, and the Allocation of Investment: An Empirical Investigation Using U.K. Panel Data by Paul Beaudry, Mustafa Caglayan and Fabio Schiantarelli. Published in volume 91, issue 3, pages 648-662 of American Economic Review, June 2001

Generalized Q Models for Investment

The Review of Economics and Statistics 1991 73(3), 383 open access
The authors extend the Q theory of investment to allow for adjustment costs for labor, under the additional assumption that the firm is a monopolistic competitor in the output market. The issue of nonconstant returns to scale is also discussed. The authors show that the standard Q model is a special case of a more general model involving testable parameter restrictions. Estimates for the U.S. manufacturing sector suggest that the departure from the assumption of perfect competition and lack of adjustment costs for labor receive empirical support in the data.

Zeros and Lumps in Investment: Empirical Evidence on Irreversibilities and Nonconvexities

The Review of Economics and Statistics 2003 85(4), 1021-1037
The objective of this paper is to investigate if and how capital adjustment departs from the smooth pattern implied by standard model based on convex adjustment costs. Using Norwegian micro data, we start by documenting the intermittent and lumpy nature of investment rates. We then present two pieces of econometric evidence on these issues. First, we estimate a discrete hazard model to determine the probability of having an episode of high investment, conditional on the length of the interval from the last high-investment episode. Second, we estimate a switching regression model that allows for the response of the investment rate to fundamentals to differ across regimes. In both cases we investigate the aggregate implications of our results.

Financial markets, banks’ cost of funding, and firms’ decisions: Lessons from two crises

Journal of Financial Intermediation 2018 36, 1-15
We test whether adverse changes to banks’ market valuations during the financial and sovereign debt crises affected firms’ real decisions. Using new data linking over 5000 non-financial Italian firms to their bank(s), we find that increases in banks’ CDS spreads, and decreases in their equity valuations, resulted in lower investment, employment, and bank debt for younger and smaller firms. These effects dominate those of banks’ balance-sheet variables. Moreover, CDS spreads matter more than equity valuations. Finally, higher CDS spreads led to lower aggregate investment and employment, and to less efficient resource allocations, especially during the sovereign debt crisis.

Internal Capital Markets in Times of Crisis: The Benefit of Group Affiliation

Review of Finance 2020 24(4), 773-811
Firms affiliated with business groups survive the stress of the global financial and euro crises better than unaffiliated firms. Using granular data from Italy, we show that better performance stems partly from access to an internal capital market, as the survival value of group-affiliated firms increases with group-wide cash flow. Internal cash transfers increase when banks’ health deteriorates, with funds moving from cash-rich to cash-poor firms and, some evidence suggests, to firms with favorable investment opportunities. Internal capital markets’ role thus increases when external markets (banks) are distressed.

Does Financial Reform Raise or Reduce Saving?

The Review of Economics and Statistics 2000 82(2), 239-263
ServŽn for useful suggestions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. DOES FINANCIAL REFORM RAISE OR REDUCE SAVING? By Oriana Bandiera*, Gerard Caprio Jr.**, Patrick Honohan* * and Fabio Schiantarelli* (*Boston College, **World Bank) The effect of financial liberalization on private saving is theoretically ambiguous, not only because the link between interest rate levels and saving is itself ambiguous, but also because financial liberalization is a multi-dimensional and phased process, sometimes involving reversals. Some dimensions, such as increased household access to consumer credit or housing finance, might also work to reduce private savings rather than increasing them. Furthermore, the long-term effect of liberalization on savings may differ substantially from the impact effect. Using Principal Components, we construct a 25-year time series index of financial

Bank Quality, Judicial Efficiency, and Loan Repayment Delays in Italy

Journal of Finance 2020 75(4), 2139-2178 open access
Italian firms delay payment to banks weakened by past loan losses. Exploiting Credit Register data, we fully absorb borrower fundamentals with firm‐quarter effects. Identification therefore reflects firm choices to delay payment to some banks, depending on their health. This selective delay occurs more where legal enforcement of collateral recovery is slow. Poor enforcement encourages borrowers not to pay when the value of their bank relationship comes into doubt. Selective delays occur even by firms able to pay all lenders. Credit losses in Italy have thus been worsened by the combination of weak banks and weak legal enforcement.