We document the growth in higher education costs and tuition over the past 50 years. To explain these trends, we develop a general equilibrium model with skill- and sector-biased technical change. Finding the model’s parameters through a combination of estimation and calibration, we show that it can explain the rise in college costs between 1961 and 2009, along with the increase in college attainment and the change in the relative earnings of college graduates. The model predicts that if college costs had ceased to grow after 1961, enrollment in 2010 would have been 3%–6% higher.

Abstract We extend the constant-elasticity regression that is the default choice when equities’ exposure to currencies is estimated. In a proper real-option-style model for the exporters’ equity exposure to the foreign exchange rate, we argue, the convexity of the relationship implies that the elasticity should depend on the exchange rate level. For instance, it should shrink to zero when the option to export becomes worthless, and that should happen at a critical exchange rate that is still strictly positive. We propose a class of tractable multi-regime regression models featuring, in line with the real-options logic, smooth transitions and within-regime dynamics in the foreign exchange exposure. We then analyze the exchange rate exposure of Chinese exporting firms and find that the model in which the moneyness of the export option has a positive impact on the exchange rate exposure detects a significantly positive and convex exposure for 40% and 65% of the firms depending on whether the market return is included in the regression or not.

Over a period that includes the 1998 Russian crisis and 2007–2009 financial crisis,banks with overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) were more likely to weaken lending standards and increase leverage than other banksin advance of a crisis,making them more vulnerable to the shock of the crisis.During crisis years, they generally experienced more increases in loan defaults, greater drops in operating and stock return performance, greater increases in expected default probability, and higher likelihood of CEO turnover or failure than other banks.CEO overconfidence thus canexplain the cross-sectional heterogeneity in risk-taking behavior among banks.

ABSTRACT During 2005 to 2007, the SEC ordered a pilot program in which one‐third of the Russell 3000 index were arbitrarily chosen as pilot stocks and exempted from short‐sale price tests. Pilot firms’ discretionary accruals and likelihood of marginally beating earnings targets decrease during this period, and revert to pre‐experiment levels when the program ends. After the program starts, pilot firms are more likely to be caught for fraud initiated before the program, and their stock returns better incorporate earnings information. These results indicate that short selling, or its prospect, curbs earnings management, helps detect fraud, and improves price efficiency.