We study preferences estimated from finite choice experiments and provide sufficient conditions for convergence to a unique underlying “true” preference. Our conditions are weak and, therefore, valid in a wide range of economic environments. We develop applications to expected utility theory, choice over consumption bundles, and menu choice. Our framework unifies the revealed preference tradition with models that allow for errors.

We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical constraints due to considerations of diversity in school choice, or scheduling in course allocation; and other forms of constraints needed to model, for example, the market for roommates, combinatorial assignment problems, and knapsack constraints. Constraints give rise to pecuniary externalities, which are internalized via prices. Agents pay to the extent that their purchases affect the value the of relevant constraints at equilibrium prices. The result is a constrained-efficient market-equilibrium outcome. The outcome is fair to the extent that constraints treat agents symmetrically.