Does director gender influence CEO empire building? Does it affect the bid premium paid for target firms? Less overconfident female directors less overestimate merger gains. As a result, firms with female directors are less likely to make acquisitions and if they do, pay lower bid premia. Using acquisition bids by S&P 1500 companies during 1997–2009 we find that each additional female director is associated with 7.6% fewer bids, and each additional female director on a bidder board reduces the bid premium paid by 15.4%. Our findings support the notion that female directors help create shareholder value through their influence on acquisition decisions. We also discuss other possible interpretations of our findings.

This paper investigates the returns to scale of large banks in the US over the period 1997–2010. This investigation is performed by estimating a random coefficient stochastic distance frontier model in the spirit of Tsionas (2002) and Greene (2005, 2008). The primary advantage of this model is that its coefficients can vary across banks, thereby allowing for unobserved technology heterogeneity among large banks in the US We find that failure to consider unobserved technology heterogeneity results in a misleading ranking of banks and mismeasured returns to scale. Our results show that the majority of large banks in the US exhibit constant returns to scale. In addition, our results suggest that banks of the same size can have different levels of returns to scale and there is no clear pattern among large banks in the US concerning the relationship between asset size and returns to scale, due to the presence of technology heterogeneity.