We investigate how the state's intervention in the investment decisions of Chinese local SOEs is affected by corporate control distance in the form of pyramidal layers and the geographical distance between the SOEs and their government controllers. Although both the corporate control distance and the geographical distance affect the state's costs of acquiring information about the SOEs, the former is created intentionally by the state to delegate decision rights, and the latter is largely exogenous. We find that local SOEs’ investment efficiency is positively associated with the extensiveness of pyramids but negatively related to the geographical distance. The positive impact of pyramid-building on investment efficiency remains strong even when information costs captured by the geographical distance are low. However, the two distance measures lose their impact on investment efficiency when local governments reclaim control through a vertical interlock of chairman. Our results indicate that the credibility of the government's intention to delegate decision rights is vital to the SOEs’ efficiency when government intervention is the norm in China.

We provide evidence that managers and controlling shareholders time management buyouts (MBOs) and freezeout transactions to take advantage of industry-wide undervaluation. Portfolios of industry peers of MBO and freezeout targets show significant alphas of around 1% per month over the 12-month period following the transaction. These returns are not explained by a battery of risk factors or empirical methodologies, but exhibit significant heterogeneity across deals. Additional tests show that, on average, abnormal returns to industry peers are a reliable proxy for those to the target firm. Further, MBOs and freezeouts are announced during troughs of industry profitability.

We propose that fitted values from market-wide regressions of firm returns on lagged firm characteristics provide useful benchmarks for assessing whether average returns to certain stocks are abnormal. To illustrate, we study eight documented events with abnormal returns, including credit rating and analyst recommendation downgrades, initial and seasoned public equity offerings, mergers and acquisitions, dividend initiations, share repurchases, and stock splits. We show that the apparently abnormal returns in the months after these events are substantially reduced or eliminated when compared to characteristic-based benchmarks. Characteristic-based benchmarks perform better in explaining post-event returns than do recent four- and five-factor models. Received September 19, 2016; editorial decision February 16, 2018 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.