We exploit cross-country variation in banks’ confidential reporting requirements under COREP, the common European supervisory risk reporting framework, as an indicator for banking supervisors’ preference for private information. Our results suggest that a stronger preference for confidential reporting is associated with significantly lower trading volume, return volatility, and absolute returns around banks’ earnings announcements. These findings are independent of the level of countries’ stock market development and supervisors’ resources and legal power, and are consistent with the idea that investors perceive banks’ public reporting to be less informative when supervisors have a strong private informational advantage. Our study adds to the literature on the influence of bank supervisors’ institutional characteristics on market discipline, and highlights the role of private supervisory knowledge in shaping investors’ monitoring incentives.

Banks often adjust their financial reporting in response to supervisory intervention. However, many banks operate under multiple supervisors with varying preferences. We examine how banks respond to such conflicting oversight within the European Banking Union, where the European Central Bank (ECB) is the central authority. The ECB’s Asset Quality Review revealed that its preferred asset valuations diverged from many banks’ IFRS-compliant practices that were previously accepted by local supervisors. Banks voluntarily aligned their reporting with the nonbinding preferences of the new central supervisor, although the adjustments varied across jurisdictions. Alignment was weaker when central and local supervisory objectives conflicted and stronger when joint supervision mitigated regulatory capture. Overall, these adjustments enhanced the informativeness of loan loss provisioning. With aligned reporting preferences across supervisory layers, the introduction of a central supervisor can thus significantly improve bank reporting and transparency, even without formal enforcement. Data Availability: The data used in this study are available from the sources identified in the manuscript.

We examine whether higher accounting comparability between public and private firms leads to higher value relevance of private firms’ reported financial information. To help develop our hypotheses, we conduct a series of interviews with M&A valuation experts. The experts indicate that comparable accounting between public and private firms allows them to apply public firms’ valuation multiples directly to private firms, which facilitates the use of private firms’ financial reporting in their valuations. Using a large sample of M&A transactions with private target firms in the European Union around the mandatory adoption of IFRS by public firms, we find that private firms’ reported financial information has higher value relevance when it has higher accounting comparability to that of public firms. Furthermore, we find that the impact of accounting comparability is stronger when public peer information is more precise. Our findings are consistent with higher accounting comparability facilitating a spillover of valuation information from public to private markets, which leads to greater value relevance of private firms’ reported financial information.

We examine how the presence of multiple supervisory agencies affects firm‐level compliance in form and substance with disclosure regulations. This analysis is important because coordination problems among regulators are frequently present in practice but often overlooked in academic research. We exploit that banks are subject to equivalent risk disclosure rules under securities laws (IFRS 7) and banking regulation (Pillar 3 of the Basel II Accord) but that different regulators start enforcing the rules at different points in time. We find that banks substantially increase their formal risk disclosures upon the adoption of Pillar 3 even if they already had to comply with the same requirements under IFRS 7. The effects are stronger if the central bank is responsible for bank supervision and bank regulators are equipped with more supervisory resources, but are less pronounced if the securities market regulator is an independent entity. In turn, banks facing more market pressures are more compliant with the rules. We further find persistent liquidity benefits of the increased risk disclosures but only after Pillar 3 became effective and its compliance was enforced by the banking regulator. Our results suggest that formal and material compliance with risk disclosure regulation are a function of both the resources of the supervisory agency and its incentive alignment with the regulated firms. In our setting, the banking regulator seems more effective in fulfilling this role.