ABSTRACT I provide evidence that stocks experiencing unusually low trading volume over the week prior to earnings announcements have more unfavorable earnings surprises. This effect is more pronounced among stocks with higher short‐selling constraints. These findings support the view that unusually low trading volume signals negative information, since, under short‐selling constraints, informed agents with bad news stay by the sidelines. Changes in visibility or risk‐based explanations are insufficient to explain the results. This evidence provides insights into why unusually low trading volume predicts price declines.

We provide evidence that sophisticated investors like short sellers, option traders, and financial institutions are more informed when trading stocks of companies with more connected board members. For firms with large director networks, the annualized return difference between the highest and lowest quintile of informed trading ranges from 4% to 7.2% compared to the same return difference in firms with less connected directors. Sophisticated investors better predict outcomes of upcoming earnings surprises and firm-specific news sentiment for companies with more connected directors. Changes in board connectedness are positively associated with changes in measures of adverse selection.

Efficiency in the capital markets requires that capital flows are sufficient to arbitrage anomalies away. We examine the relation between flows to a quantitative (quant) strategy that is based on capital market anomalies and the subsequent performance of this strategy. When these flows are high, quant funds are able to implement arbitrage strategies more effectively, which in turn leads to lower profitability of market anomalies in the future, and vice versa. Thus, the degree of cross-sectional equity market efficiency varies across time with the availability of arbitrage capital.