This paper examines multi-period compensation contracts when retirement is anticipated. Short-term contracts in long-term employment relationships are equivalent to a long-term renegotiation-proof contract. The dynamic of incentive rates is determined by (i) how and in which periods managerial effort affects the contractible performance measures; and by (ii) the time-series correlation of error terms in performance reports. The model explains why long-term investments can decrease while incentive rates increase as managers approach retirement. Earnings persistence is negatively associated to earnings-based incentive rates but, towards retirement, high earnings persistence implies increasing earnings-based incentive rates.

In multi‐task environments, the efficiency of aggregating managerial performance information and the degree of customization/standardization are closely related. Aggregation without information loss (i.e., statistically sufficient) requires at least as many measures as there are effective tasks (which arise through a task aggregation process analogous to that applied to homogeneous activities in activity‐based costing) and can be used uniformly for evaluation across similar jobs. Aggregation without economic loss (i.e., economically sufficient) can be achieved with a single performance measure but requires customization even across similar jobs. The main implication is that job complexity, the number of aggregate performance measures, and the degree of customization in performance measurement are interrelated. In particular, at the same level of performance measure aggregation, we predict highly customized performance evaluation in complex multi‐task jobs and standardized (uniform) performance evaluation only in simpler jobs with fewer tasks. We discuss additional empirical implications in the conclusion.

This paper analyzes the impact of signal-to-noise-ratios and the autocorrelation of a performance measure on the principal's welfare in dynamic agencies with renegotiation. We consider the impact of changes in the persistent, transitory, and reversible components of accounting earnings on its usefulness in valuation versus contracting. Increasing the persistent components and reducing the reversible components are generally desirable for valuation, but not for contracting. Eliminating transitory components of earnings is generally desirable for valuation, but not necessarily for contracting. We discuss the contracting implications of differences in the autocorrelations of accounting earnings versus stock returns.

Indjejikian and Nanda (J. Accounting and Economics 27 (1999) 177) establish that “lack of commitment” results in an expected economic loss, relative to a long-term full-commitment contract, if there is inter-period correlation of performance measures. They attribute this loss to a “ratchet effect”. We demonstrate the following. First, their proposed equilibrium is not sustained unless there is some form of limited commitment. Second, these limited commitment assumptions need not induce a “ratchet effect”. Third, the “ratchet effect” is neither necessary nor sufficient for an expected economic loss to occur—the loss is due to the principal's inability to commit ex ante to the second-period incentive rate.

We characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for communication of private, unverifiable managerial information to be valuable for stewardship purposes. First, the hard, verifiable information must be able to confirm to some extent the truthfulness of the manager's soft, unverifiable report. Second, neither the hard, verifiable information nor the soft, unverifiable managerial report should be too informative for providing effort incentives because that makes it harder to motivate truthful reports from the manager. In particular, this conflict can be sufficiently severe that eliciting reports from the manager has no value.

Both soft, noncontractible, and hard, contractible, information are informative about managerial ability and future firm performance. If a manager's future compensation depends on expectations of ability or future performance, then the manager has implicit incentives to affect the information. We examine the real incentive effects of soft information in a dynamic agency with limited commitment. When long‐term contracts are renegotiated, the rewards for future performance inherent in long‐term contracts allow the principal partial control over the implicit incentives. This is because the soft information affects the basis for contract renegotiation. With short‐term contracts, the principal has no control over the basis for contract negotiation, and thus long‐term contracts generally dominate short‐term contracts. With long‐term contracts, the principal's control over implicit incentives is characterized in terms of effective contracting on an implicit aggregation of the soft information that arises from predicting (forming expectations of) future performance. We provide sufficient conditions for soft information to have no real incentive effects. In general, implicit incentives not controllable by the principal include fixed effects, such as career concerns driven by labor markets external to the agency. When controllable incentives span the fixed effects of career concerns, the latter have no real effects with regard to total managerial incentives—they would optimally be the same with or without career concerns. Our analysis suggests empirical tests for estimating career concerns that should explicitly incorporate noncontractible information.

We demonstrate analytically and empirically that valuing a firm with foreign operations in the presence of exchange rate uncertainty requires information on the foreign operating cash flows disaggregated by currency and persistence. In particular, given consolidated earnings, investors need information on the exchange gain or loss on permanent foreign operating cash flows. We extend the model to show how the permanent foreign cash flows can be used to condition the change in the translation adjustment to make it value‐relevant; however, using the permanent foreign cash flows directly is superior for valuation purposes. The empirical tests support our hypothesis that the market response to exchange rate movements is sensitive to the relative magnitudes of revenues and costs denominated in each foreign currency in which a firm has transactions. Disclosure of cash flows by currency should enhance the valuation of firms with foreign operations.