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Opportunities, Welfare, and Social Justice: A Review of Fishkin'sBottlenecks

Journal of Economic Literature 2017 55(2), 580-591 open access
In his Bottlenecks: A New Theory of Equal Opportunity, Joseph Fishkin claims he presents an entirely new way of thinking about equality of opportunity. The core of the new theory is the call for opportunity pluralism, which consists in enlarging the range of opportunities available to people at every stage in life. In this essay, we discuss how successful Fishkin is at shaking the way economists think about equality of opportunity. We identify two aspects of Fishkin's theory that deeply conflict with economic theories of equality of opportunity. Those aspects have to do with the way economists interpret the ethical values of respect for preferences and responsibility. We also argue that the way Fishkin suggests to look at opportunities can help economists fill gaps in the way they define well-being and social justice.

Optimal Income Taxation Theory and Principles of Fairness

Journal of Economic Literature 2018 56(3), 1029-1079 open access
The achievements and limitations of the classical theory of optimal labor-income taxation based on social welfare functions are now well known. Even though utilitarianism still dominates public economics, recent interest has arisen for broadening the normative approach and making room for fairness principles such as desert or responsibility. Fairness principles sometimes provide immediate recommendations about the relative weights to assign to various income ranges, but in general require a careful choice of utility representations embodying the relevant interpersonal comparisons. The main message of this paper is that the traditional tool of welfare economics, the social welfare function framework, is flexible enough to incorporate many approaches, from egalitarianism to libertarianism.

Fair Income Tax

Review of Economic Studies 2006 73(1), 55-83
In a model where agents have unequal skills and heterogeneous preferences over consumption and leisure, we look for the optimal tax on the basis of efficiency and fairness principles and under incentive-compatibility constraints. The fairness principles considered here are: (1) a weak version of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle; (2) a condition precluding redistribution when all agents have the same skills. With such principles we construct and justify specific social preferences and derive a simple criterion for the evaluation of income tax schedules. Namely, the lower the greatest average tax rate over the range of low incomes, the better. We show that, as a consequence, the optimal tax should give the greatest subsidies to the working poor (the agents having the lowest skill and choosing the largest labour time).

Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good

Econometrica 2004 72(2), 627-640
We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good. A social ordering function determines for each profile of preferences an ordering of all conceivable allocations. We propose the following Free Lunch Aversion condition: if the private good contributions of two agents consuming the same quantity of the nonrival good have opposite signs, reducing that gap improves social welfare. This condition, combined with the more standard requirements of Unanimous Indifference and Responsiveness, delivers a form of welfare egalitarianism in which an agent's welfare is measured by the quantity of the nonrival good that, consumed at no cost, would leave her indifferent to the bundle she is assigned.