I compare issuer-paid ratings, represented by Standard & Poor's (S&P) to investor-paid ratings, represented by Egan-Jones Ratings Company (EJR), after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. My results show that S&P ratings are lower than EJR ratings in the post-Dodd-Frank period, especially for firms able to generate revenue to credit rating agencies (CRAs); i.e., firms with a large bond issuance, larger firms, and low-performing firms. Further, I find evidence of a greater accuracy of S&P ratings relative to EJR ratings in the post-Act period as shown by the lower probability of large credit rating changes and rating reversals. Finally, I show that issuer-paid ratings are more concerned about providing timely ratings in the post-Dodd-Frank period, thus protecting their reputation as leading information providers, than investor-paid ratings. My results are robust to a wide battery of robustness tests.

We examine the impact of economic policy uncertainty on trade credit. We document a decline (increase) in accounts payable, receivable, and net credit during periods of high (low) policy uncertainty and that firms react quickly to changes in uncertainty. The relation is long-term and holds after controlling for endogeneity, non-policy economic and political uncertainties, and the Great Recession. Industry competitiveness, proxied by firm market power, moderates the impact of economic policy uncertainty on trade credit. Uncertainty about monetary and fiscal policies, taxes, and regulations are the major drivers of trade credit changes. The reduction in trade credit during periods of increasing uncertainty can be explained by financial distress, constraints, and relation-specific investment channels.