Because of changes in tax regulations and increased political pressure, firms are reconsidering their practices of shifting manufacturing operations offshore to lower wage countries. Although outsourcing has been well researched, few studies examine managerial practices that influence offshore operations. We investigate the effects of choices regarding labor, suppliers, and outsourcing that influence firm longevity in the maquiladora industry in Mexico. We argue that firms are exposed to labor frictions, supply-chain constraints, and compliance and regulatory risks that if left unresolved can lead to plant closure attributable to labor or regulatory frictions and rising costs. We consider specific actions pursued by managers at maquiladora plants to mitigate the underlying constraints and then analyze factors that affect the likelihood of continuing operations, that is, the longevity of the plants. We find a positive relation between the likelihood of longevity in operations and the following plant characteristics: hourly wages, workforce stability, skill, and the decision to outsource regulatory compliance functions. We document a negative relation between longevity and total labor cost as a percent of total costs as well as using suppliers based in Mexico. We also find that high-tech plants have higher stability, pay higher wages, and experience greater longevity than low-tech plants. Overall, we identify key managerial choices that are related to longevity in offshoring production.

This study examines the influence of Mexico’s efforts to improve corporate governance on firm performance and transparency. We utilize compliance data from the Code of ‘Best’ Corporate Practices, disclosed annually by public firms in Mexico, as a measure of corporate governance strength. We document a significant increase in compliance over 2000–2004 indicating Mexican companies view non-compliance as costly. However, we find no association between the governance index and firm performance, nor is there a relation with transparency. Instead, we find firms with greater compliance resort to the more costly mechanism of making dividend payments (higher propensity to pay and greater yield) to reduce agency conflicts. We conclude these associations are the direct result of the institutional features of the Mexican business environment, which is characterized by concentrated ownership of insiders, interlocked boards of directors, a lack of insider trading enforcement, and generally poor protection of minority investors. Our results show that monitoring mechanisms alone are not enough to fundamentally change economic behavior.