We develop a simple model of IPO timing with uncertain aftermarket retail demand. Firms prefer to go public when they expect to exploit sentiment-driven investors' overvaluations by setting offer prices above fundamental value. However, some firms have profitable investment opportunities that require immediate financing. This generates two empirical predictions: (i) the quality of the issuers' investments and (ii) their long-run performance decrease with expected retail demand. Using average IPO first-day returns as a proxy for retail demand, we find strong empirical support for the model. First, following the IPO, issuers in low-underpricing periods become more profitable and have higher investment rates than their peers. In contrast, issuers in high-underpricing periods have similar investment rates as their control firms, but become less profitable. Second, issuers in high-underpricing periods tend to underperform in the long-run, while issuers in low-underpricing periods do not.

We study incentive contracts used by asset management firms in Norway, focusing on how bonus structures impact performance. The incentive contracts in our sample are heterogeneous, with firms rewarding fund managers based on both quantitative and qualitative targets. We find that higher potential bonuses tied to quantitative metrics, such as the information ratio, lead to better risk-adjusted performance at year-end. Managers at risk of missing bonus thresholds attempt to boost performance through portfolio adjustments, but these efforts backfire, resulting in worse outcomes in the latter part of the year.