Frank H. Selto, Maclyn L. Clouse, An Investigation of Managers' Adaptations to SFAS No. 2: Accounting for Research and Development Costs, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Autumn, 1985), pp. 700-717

The purpose of this paper is to examine controllability: the notion a manager should be evaluated based on that which she or he controls. We embed the managerial evaluation problem in a principal-agent setting and ask whether the optimal agency solution bears any logical relation to a casual definition of controllability. It does not. More to the point, the agency framework compels us to look at information content. This information content perspective, upon reflection, agrees with our intuition, with our anecdotal Impressions of practice, and with the dictates of the principal-agent model. Moreover, there is a well-defined relation between information content and a notion of control. Thus, the Information content perspective may be thought of as offering a precise definition of controllability.

Frank H. Selto, Hugh D. Grove, The Predictive Power of Voting Power Indices: FASB Voting on Statements of Financial Accounting Standards Nos. 45-69, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Autumn, 1983), pp. 619-622

The allegations and conclusions of the Metcalf report (U.S. Senate [1977]) motivated attempts to explain or refute the notion that the setting of financial accounting standards is controlled by special interest groups (Haring [1979], Hussein and Ketz [1980], Patton [1980], and Newman [1981a; 1981b]). Given the assumptions of the voting model tested in each case, the results suggest no apparent control of the Financial Accounting Standards Board by the so-called accounting establishmentBig public accounting firms and their clients. Each of these studies examined the past voting behavior of accounting policy bodies and tested hypotheses regarding certain sorts of coalition formation, primarily coalitions of public accountants from Big Eight firms. Even though there was no evidence of control by the Big Eight, Newman [1981a] argued that the Big Eight still had the potential to control the FASB. His argument was supported by a priori calculations of real voting power indices of a possible bloc of FASB representatives drawn from these largest public accounting firms. Newman's calculations rest on three forms of critical assumptions underlying the application of a priori real voting power indices to actual voting situations. These assumptions affect the outcomes and the relevance of voting power indices for such analyses. The objectives of this

This study tests the effect of homework collection and quizzes on exam scores. Expectancy theory as modified by Porter and Lawler [1968] suggests that performance (a student's exam score) is dependent upon effort, abilities and traits, and role perception (regarding the class). An accounting instructor is able to influence a student's effort through assigning different tasks (teaching techniques) which may include homework collection or quizzes. In this study, a Latin square design allows several teaching techniques to be tested in four accounting classes and controls for possible bias in exam scores resulting from time of class and exam difficulty. Additionally, GPA is used as a covariate. The results indicate that the selected teaching techniques do not significantly affect exam scores.