This paper provides empirical evidence on the information in the term structure for longer maturities about both future inflation and the term structure of real interest rates. The evidence indicates that there is substantial information in the longer maturity term structure about future inflation: the slope of the term structure does have a great deal of predictive power for future changes in inflation. On the other hand, at the longer maturities, the term structure of nominal interest rates contains very little information about the term structure of real interest rates. These results are strikingly different from those found for very short-term maturities, six months or less, in previous work. For maturities of six months or less, the term structure contains no information about the future path of inflation, but it does contain a great deal of information about the term structure of real interest rates. The evidence in this paper does indicate that, at longer maturities, the term structure of interest rates can be used to help assess future inflationary pressures: when the slope of the term structure steepens, it is an indication that the inflation rate will rise in the future and when the slope falls, it is an indication that the inflation rate will fall. However, we must still remain cautious about using the evidence presented here to advocate that the Federal Reserve should target on the term structure in conducting monetary policy. A change in Federal Reserve operating procedures which focuses on the term structure may well cause the relationship between the term structure and future inflation to shift, with the result that the term structure no longer remains an accurate guide to the path of future inflation. If this were to occur, Federal Reserve monetary policy could go far astray by focusing on the term structure of interest rates.

This paper argues that although financial consolidation creates some dangers because it is leading to larger institutions who might expose the US financial system to increased systemic risk, these dangers can be handled by vigilant supervision and a government safety net with an appropriate amount of constructive ambiguity. Financial consolidation also opens up opportunities to dramatically reduce the scope of deposit insurance and limit it to narrow bank accounts, thus substantially reducing the moral hazard created by the government safety net. Reducing the scope of deposit insurance, however, does not eliminate the need for a government safety net, and thus there is still a strong need for adequate prudential supervision of the financial system. Moving to a world in which we have larger, nationwide, diversified financial institutions and in which deposit insurance plays a very limited role, should improve the efficiency of the financial system. However, it is no panacea: the job of financial regulators and supervisors will continue to be highly challenging in the future.

A heated debate has arisen over the policy ineffectiveness proposition associate with the work of Lucas, Sargent, and Wallace. It postulates that anticipated aggregate demand policy will have no effect on business-cycle fluctuations, so that one deterministic, feedback policy rule is as good as any other from the point of view of stabilizing the economy. This paper develops a methodology for empirically analyzing rational-expectations models displaying this neutrality result and then applies it to the important question of whether anticipated monetary policy matters to the business cycle.