We evaluate the influence of the pandemic on global bank lending and identify bank and country characteristics that amplify or weaken the effect of the disease outbreak on bank credit. Using a sample of banks from 125 countries, we apply a difference-in-difference methodology and find that bank lending is weaker in countries that are more affected by the health crisis. This effect depends on the bank's financial conditions, market structure, regulatory and institutional environment, financial intermediary and debt market development, ease of access of corporate firms to debt capital, and the response of the public health sector to the crisis.

We study the influence of policy uncertainty on the moral behavior of firms. When facing uncertainty, managers perceive various socioeconomic obstacles as more severe and disruptive to their business. Using data from policy uncertainty spouts in 93 countries, we document that some firms engage in norm-deviant behavior by cheating on taxes and paying more bribes. While private firms prefer to cheat on taxes, public firms choose bribery as a favorite tool to “grease the wheels” during periods of uncertainty. Strong social capital (local trust and religiosity) breaks this link between uncertainty and corruption.