We assess the impact of institutional investors’ demand for gilts on UK real rates by structurally estimating the model of Vayanos and Vila (2009). We therefore include those investors believed to display inelastic demand for gilts and preferences for longer-term maturities. The estimated model fits the term structure of real rates well, and strongly supports our choice of institutional investors. These investors’ demand contributed to the decline in medium- to longer-term real rates by compressing bond risk premia. However, the price impact varied across investors and over time, and was only partly attenuated by increased supply.

We develop a multivariate credit risk model that accounts for joint defaults of banks and allows us to disentangle how much of banks’ credit risk is systemic. We find that the United States and United Kingdom differ not only in the evolution of systemic risk but, in particular, in their banks’ systemic exposures. In both countries, however, systemic credit risk varies substantially, represents about half of total bank credit risk on average, and induces high risk premia. The results suggest that sovereign and bank systemic risk are particularly interlinked in the United Kingdom.

Using model-free skewness measures that exploit the asymmetry in semivariances and option data from the over-the-counter currency market, we find that buying currencies with a high skewness risk premium (SRP) and selling currencies with a low SRP generates high returns and a Sharpe ratio. Asset pricing tests—which control for omitted variables and measurement errors—show that a SRP factor enters the currency pricing kernel and is central to the pricing of risks inherent in a broad currency cross section of 60 portfolio excess returns. These results imply that skewness risk is a strong and priced source of currency risk.

Applying standard portfolio-sort techniques to bank asset returns for 15 countries from 2004 to 2018, we uncover a risk premium associated with implicit government guarantees. This risk premium is intimately tied to sovereign risk, suggesting that guaranteed banks, defined as those of particular importance to the national economy, inherit the risk of the guarantor. Indeed, this premium does not exist in safe-haven countries. We rationalize these findings with a model in which implicit government guarantees are risky in the sense that they provide protection that depends on the aggregate state of the economy.

We study a large currency cross-section using asset pricing methods that account for omitted-variable and measurement-error biases. First, we show that the pricing kernel includes at least three latent factors that resemble (but are not identical to) a strong U.S. “dollar” factor and two weak high Sharpe ratio “carry” and “momentum” slope factors. Evidence for an additional “value” factor is weaker. Second, using this pricing kernel, we find that only a small fraction of the over 100 nontradable candidate factors considered have a statistically significant risk premium, mostly relating to volatility, uncertainty, and liquidity conditions, rather than macro variables.