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Cross country linkages and transmission of sovereign risk: Evidence from China’s credit default swaps

Journal of Financial Stability 2022 58, 100838
China’s climb to a trading powerhouse has changed its position in the world and therefore its relationships with other economies. As a result, its sovereign credit risk, which we measure by the pricing of its credit default swaps (CDS), now has the potential to greatly impact other sovereign CDS spreads. Employing a dynamic approach, we find that changes in China’s sovereign risk has strong contagion effects on its goods and service providers, while China is vulnerable to contagion effects from its major importers, suggesting sovereign risk spills over to other regions via the global supply chain. China’s success hurts some of the weaker countries in Europe by competing for their customers, while China faces strong competition itself from its export-focused neighbors. FDI and portfolio investment also affect the CDS relationships between China and other economies.

Explicit deposit insurance design: International effects on bank lending during the global financial crisis✰

Journal of Financial Intermediation 2022 51, 100958
Studies find that during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, loan spreads rose and corporate lending tightened, especially for foreign borrowers (a flight-home effect). We find that banks in countries with explicit deposit insurance (DI) made smaller reductions in total lending and foreign lending, experienced smaller increases in loan spreads, and had quicker post-crisis recoveries. These effects are more pronounced for banks heavily relying on deposit funding. Evidence also reveals that more generous or credible DI design is associated with a stronger stabilization effect on bank lending during the crisis, confirmed by the difference-in-differences analysis based on expansion of DI coverage during the crisis. The stabilization effect is robust to the use of country-specific crisis measures and control of temporary government guarantees.