[We investigate the extent to which hedge fund managers smooth self-reported returns. In contrast to prior research on the "anomalous" properties of hedge fund returns, we observe the mechanisms used to price the fund's investment positions and report the fund's performance to investors, thereby allowing us to differentiate between asset illiquidity and misreporting-based explanations. We find that funds using less verifiable pricing sources and funds that provide managers with greater discretion in pricing investment positions are more likely to have returns consistent with intentional smoothing. Traditional controls, however, such as removing the manager from the setting and reporting of the fund's net asset value and the use of reputable auditors and administrators, are not associated with lower levels of smoothing. With respect to asset illiquidity versus misreporting, investment style and portfolio characteristics explain 14.0—24.3% of the variation in our smoothing measures, and pricing controls explain an additional 4.1—8.8%, suggesting that asset illiquidity is the major factor driving the anomalous properties of self-reported hedge fund returns.]

Using a representative sample of entrepreneurs who are in the process of starting a business, this study investigates the determinants of the preparation of financial statements and projections in start-up ventures. Consistent with predictions from information economics and contracting, I find that the use of outside funding, level of competition, and venture scale are positively associated with the intended frequency of financial statement preparation. However, comparing the economic significance of alternative influences suggests that the benefit of reducing competitive and fundamental uncertainty is more influential in explaining variations in intentions to prepare financial statements. Further, I find the determinants of preparation frequency vary among different financial statements; for instance, cash statements are more important for start-ups with products in earlier stages of development and with greater competition. In contrast to financial statements, the preparation of projections such as formal financial projections and regular sales forecasts by start-ups is positively associated with the importance of intangible investments such as patents, research and development, and with start-ups in high-tech industries.

We investigate the influence of peer quality on subjective performance evaluation using 75,413 ratings of 130 employees from 6,908 raters in a business school setting. We find that subjective performance ratings are lower for employees with higher quality peer groups in both randomized and nonrandomized settings. Using a novel long‐window setting, we observe peer effects persisting, but slowly decaying, for several months even when priming raters with the employees' previous performance information. We find that the strength of the peer effects is greater for focal employees with weaker performance, for the peers with higher attribute similarity, and when the performance of peers is more extreme. Overall, we find strong and persistent peer effects in subjective performance evaluation.

We investigate the extent to which hedge fund managers smooth self-reported returns. In contrast to prior research on the “anomalous” properties of hedge fund returns, we observe the mechanisms used to price the fund's investment positions and report the fund's performance to investors, thereby allowing us to differentiate between asset illiquidity and misreporting-based explanations. We find that funds using less verifiable pricing sources and funds that provide managers with greater discretion in pricing investment positions are more likely to have returns consistent with intentional smoothing. Traditional controls, however, such as removing the manager from the setting and reporting of the fund's net asset value and the use of reputable auditors and administrators, are not associated with lower levels of smoothing. With respect to asset illiquidity versus misreporting, investment style and portfolio characteristics explain 14.0–24.3% of the variation in our smoothing measures, and pricing controls explain an additional 4.1–8.8%, suggesting that asset illiquidity is the major factor driving the anomalous properties of self-reported hedge fund returns.

We investigate the determinants of hedge fund internal controls and their association with the fees that funds charge investors. Hedge funds are subject to minimal regulation. Hence, hedge fund managers voluntarily implement internal controls, and managers and investors freely contract on fees. We find that internal controls are stronger in funds with higher potential agency costs. Further, internal controls are stronger in funds domiciled in jurisdictions that provide investors with limited legal redress for fraud and financial misstatements. Short selling funds, however, are more likely to protect information about their investment positions by implementing weaker internal controls. With respect to fees, we find that the percentage of positive profits that the manager receives increases in the strength of the fund’s internal controls. Finally, removing the manager from setting and reporting the fund’s official net asset value, along with reputational incentives and monitoring by leverage providers, are all associated with lower likelihoods of future regulatory investigations of fraud and/or financial misstatement.

Complexity in applying financial accounting standards can have real operational effects if firms alter their actions in response to increased reporting costs. We examine whether the introduction of ASU 2017‐12, designed to reduce compliance burden and better align hedge accounting rules with risk management practices, led to more effective hedging. Using detailed hedging disclosures, we show that firms that adopt the ASU expand the use of hedge‐accounted derivatives and reduce exposures to interest rate and foreign currency risks. ASU‐adopting firms also reduce cash flow volatility, increase their use of debt, invest more, and reduce information asymmetry in the equity market. Our analyses reveal that easing hedge effectiveness tests and reliefs targeting “cash flow hedges” and “net investment hedges of foreign operations” were the most influential of the ASU's reforms. Our study is the first to integrate the effects of hedge accounting frictions on firms’ risk management activities and resulting spillovers to debt financing and investments.

We examine whether more sophisticated accounting methods (in the form of accrual accounting) interact with other information sources to reduce information asymmetries between small business borrowers and lenders, thereby lowering borrowers׳ probability of loan denial and cost of debt. We find that higher third party credit scores, but not the use of accrual accounting, decrease the likelihood of loan denial. However, firms using accrual accounting exhibit statistically lower interest rates after controlling for many factors associated with the cost of debt. Further, the interest rate benefits from accrual accounting are greatest when the borrower׳s credit score is low and/or the length of its banking relationship with the lender is short. This evidence indicates that accrual accounting can benefit small business borrowers, but that the information contained in third-party credit scores and obtained through ongoing banking relationships can substitute for the incremental information provided by accrual accounting.

We exploit a one-month period when SEC activity largely stopped during a U.S. government shutdown to examine whether variation in SEC scrutiny affects its ability to enforce insider trading. Difference-in-differences analyses suggest insiders earn abnormal profits during the shutdown, and the findings are robust to using different control periods and groups. We estimate that it takes roughly one week before the abnormally profitable trading begins, consistent with insiders updating their beliefs regarding the duration and disruption of the shutdown. Supporting the claim that SEC regulatory activity drops with the shutdown and does not fully recover afterward, we find a decline in the frequency of insider trading enforcement releases, investigations, and comment letter issuances after the SEC resumes operations. Our study speaks to the SEC insider trading enforcement literature and economic consequences of a regulatory discontinuity in a divisive political climate. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources.