Loan performance of subprime originations during the boom years of 2004–2006 is contrasted with that of subprime originations during the early period of 2000–2002. A counterfactual technique is developed to determine how originations during the early period would perform in a different environment, namely, the environment faced by originations of 2004, 2005, and 2006. In an environment where house prices are increasing rapidly, low credit score originations do not show high rates of default—as was witnessed for 2000–2002 cohorts. However, in an environment of stagnant or deteriorating home prices, low credit score originations show significantly higher rates of default than high credit score originations. With a greater proportion of low credit score originations, earlier cohorts of 2000–2002 were no less vulnerable to the environment faced by cohorts of 2004–2006. In essence, these results raise concerns about the viability of all cohorts of subprime originations because of their reliance on the appreciation of the underlying collateral rather than the creditworthiness of the borrower.

Investors face significant barriers in evaluating the performance of hedge funds and commodity trading advisors (CTAs). The only available performance data comes from voluntary reporting to private companies. Funds have incentives to strategically report to these companies, causing these data sets to be severely biased. And, because hedge funds use nonlinear, state-dependent, leveraged strategies, it has proven difficult to determine whether they add value relative to benchmarks. We focus on commodity trading advisors, a subset of hedge funds, and show that during the period 1994-2007 CTA excess returns to investors (i.e., net of fees) averaged 85 basis points per annum over US T-bills, which is insignificantly different from zero. We estimate that CTAs on average earned gross excess returns (i.e., before fees) of 5.4%, which implies that funds captured most of their performance through charging fees. Yet, even before fees we find that CTAs display no alpha relative to simple futures strategies that are in the public domain. We argue that CTAs appear to persist as an asset class despite their poor performance, because they face no market discipline based on credible information. Our evidence suggests that investors' experience of poor performance is not common knowledge.