Recent occurrences of financial distress to some insurers have raised questions about whether the current guaranty system is adequate to protect policyholders. Four new systems have been proposed. Using the state preference model, it was found the Stewart's national system faring the best, if it adopts uniform regulation. Based on agency theory, the pre-assessment approach and the policyholder surcharge (or premium increase) recoupment method were found to be better than the current post-assessment approach and premium tax offset method. Furthermore, uniform policy limits and regulations are recommended.

Using bond downgrades as external shocks to life insurers’ asset risk, we document several findings of the impact of organizational structure and risk factors on investment risk taking. First, we find that mutual insurers and widely-held stock insurers are more likely to sell downgraded bonds than are closely-held stock insurers. Second, we find evidence that insurers are less likely to sell downgraded bonds that remain in the same rating class than bonds downgraded to a lower rating class. The result implies that insurers sell downgraded bonds mainly because of additional capital charge is imposed, not because of downgrade itself. In other words, risk factors in risk-based capital regulation do matter on life insurers’ investment risk taking. Finally, we find that life insurers might be reluctant to sell downgraded bonds at fire-sale prices during the 2008–2009 financial crisis.

Using a sample of US publicly traded property-liability insurers, we examine the effect of corporate transparency on earnings management. We find that a higher level of corporate transparency is associated with more conservative loss-reserves estimation. Our evidence shows that the positive effect of corporate transparency on insurers’ reserves-estimate conservatism is more pronounced for insurers that are smaller and have more diversified lines of business and that certain board characteristics—such as being smaller, meeting more frequently, and having a higher percentage of independent directors—can restrain the inadequate reserves management of less transparent US publicly traded property-liability insurers. We also provide evidence that additional regulatory mandates to seek greater transparency in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may be redundant, given the existing regulations in the property-liability insurance industry. Finally, we find insurers’ conservative reserve estimates were more pronounced during the 2008–2009 financial crisis.