We investigate the interaction of mandatory disclosure and the gathering of decision‐relevant information in a setting in which a competitor may enter the market. Gathering detailed information allows for an efficient allocation of resources, but eventually attracts competition by revealing beneficial information to competitors. In contrast, refraining from generating detailed information implies inefficient decisions, but eventually prevents competitors from entering the market. Our results show that an incentive not to generate internal information arises for two reasons: If the incumbent's cost advantage is sufficiently large, disclosing aggregated information can be an instrument to avoid competition by reducing the likelihood of market entry. If the incumbent's cost advantage is small, disclosing aggregated information attracts competition by increasing the likelihood of market entry. In this case, imprecise cost information serves as a commitment device to reduce the intensity of competition by forcing the competitor to take into account his efficiency disadvantage in making his production decision.

This study investigates the impact of the harmonization of tax transfer pricing across jurisdictions on multinational companies’ reporting and tax authorities’ auditing strategies. Applying a game-theoretical approach, we assess how enhancing standards consistency and global tax transparency influences tax avoidance and double taxation, producer and consumer surplus, and countries’ tax revenue. Although increasing transparency is generally perceived to discourage tax avoidance, we show that this effect vanishes when standards are inconsistent. We demonstrate that high global tax transparency and consistent standards maximize global social welfare. However, from the perspective of multinational companies or individual countries, the optimal mix of consistency and transparency may differ. These findings highlight why transfer pricing harmonization is difficult and how single-player incentives undermine the envisioned benefits of tax harmonization. This study offers valuable insights for policymakers who aim to curb tax avoidance and mitigate the risk of double taxation.