This article examines a model of "semiefficient" bargaining in which the union and the firm bargain over wages and various types of work rules. The results are compared to the outcomes that are associated with fully efficient bargaining (i.e., over wages and the level of employment) and bargaining solely over wages.

Who should pay the resource costs of higher education? This paper investigates a simple model of the general equilibrium of the labor market with three skill levels. Those in the population with the lower level of intelligence and/or sophistication can only become low-skilled workers, but the brighter segment of the population can become either high- or medium-skilled workers. Given the tax structure, the welfare of each group is maximized by a unique subsidy rate on the cost of training high-skilled workers. Under several circumstances, the lower IQ group wants a higher subsidy rate than will the group that benefits directly from the training.

Journal Article Uncertainty and Price Theory: Comment Get access George E. Johnson George E. Johnson University of California, Berkeley Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 78, Issue 4, November 1964, Pages 647–648, https://doi.org/10.2307/1879662 Published: 01 November 1964

Empirical evaluation of the effect of school quality, or type and amount of resources per student, on adult earnings requires a conceptual framework. A model of the returns to schooling in a simple human capital growth context is extended to illustrate how factors such as consumption benefits of students, parental concern over equity between siblings, and use of schools to facilitate parental labor supply can alter the apparent return to school quality. The need for microlevel time diary and other data on human capital formation in both classrooms and families is highlighted.

The purpose of this paper is to examine certain received theories of the firm, trade union behavior, and bargaining in order to derive testable implications concerning the conditions under which labor disputes are more likely to occur. There are at least three reasons why an investigation of industrial strike activity seems fruitful. First, it might be argued that, because of their relatively frequent disruption of key sectors of the economy, work stoppages are the most important public policy issue raised by the existence of trade unions. It would therefore be useful to know whether, as Hicks thought, the majority of actual strikes are doubtless the result of faulty negotiation [18, p. 146] or whether they are an inevitable part of the functioning of an institutionalized market economy. Although it has long been known that the level of strike activity follows the business cycle [23] [20] [29], this leaves open the questions of the behavioral relations involved and their stability over time. Second, data on industrial disputes provide a potentially rich source of material for testing the implications of bargaining theories which purport to explain the outcome of labor-management negotiations.' Yet little work seems to have been done to date on the application of bargaining theoretic models to nonexperimeiltal data. A third reason for undertaking a study of this problem stems from the continuing interest in the effect of unions upon both the relative wage structure and the rate of change of aggregate money wages. Most union power is derived from the threat of the strike, and, accordingly, we agree with Charles Holt's recent suggestion that . the theory and analysis of industrial disputes may belp to clarify the role that unions play in the determination of wages [19, p. 50].