Interest in too big to fail (TBTF) resolutions of insolvent large complex financial firms has intensified in recent years. TBTF resolutions protect some in-the-money counterparties of a targeted insolvent firm from losses that they would suffer if the usual bankruptcy resolution regimes used in resolving other firms in the industry were applied. Although special TBTF resolution regimes may reduce the collateral spill-over costs of the failure, the combined direct and indirect costs from such “bailouts” may be large and often financed in part or in total by taxpayers. Thus, TBTF has become a major public policy issue that has not been resolved in part because of disagreements about definitions and thereby the estimates of the benefits and costs. This paper explores these differences and develops a framework for standardizing the definitions and evaluating the desirability of TBTF resolutions more accurately.

George G. Kaufman, Comment: Edelstein and Follain Papers, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 14, No. 4, Proceedings of 14th Annual Conference of the Western Finance Association, June 21-23, 1979 (Nov., 1979), pp. 805-806

Like any course, the basic money and financial institutions course, or money and banking as it is more frequently designated, takes on the unique coloration of the instructor. However, this course appears to be so affected more than most other finance and economics courses at this level. This occurs because, although it is a second course, it is still a very broad course in design, and more importantly, because it encompasses the three approaches to the teaching of economics and finance–description, theory, and policy. Different instructors emphasize different aspects, at times, to the almost total exclusion of one or both of the other two. But, judging from the financial failure of textbooks that have attempted to focus on just one of these aspects, say, financial institutions or monetary economics, it appears that most instructors prefer the broader and more diffuse coverage. And so do I.

A number of recent articles have explored the reasons underlying observed differences in deposit variability among commercial banks. The variability of deposits at individual banks is of interest to bank management, the Federal Reserve, and the general public for several reasons:1. Deposit variability is frequently included as an important determinant of portfolio strategy. The more volatile a bank's deposits are, the more liquid its mix of assets will be.

George G. Kaufman, The Strange Journey of Monetary Indicators, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 7, No. 2, Supplement: Outlook for the Securities Industry (Mar., 1972), pp. 1625-1639