[In the context of an equilibrium asset-pricing model, the dynamics of the instantaneous real interest rate and the instantaneous rate of expected inflation are estimated. Unlike previous models, we allow real interest rates and inflation to be mutually dependent processes. The model is estimated as a state-space system that includes observations on various maturity Treasury bills and NBER-ASA survey forecasts of inflation. Over the period 1968-1988, we find evidence that instantaneous real interest rates and expected inflation are significantly negatively correlated. Real interest rates also display greater volatility and weaker mean reversion than expected inflation.]

[A model of multimarket spatial competition is developed where small, single-market banks compete with large, multimarket banks (LMBs) for retail loans and deposits. Consistent with empirical evidence, LMBs are assumed to set retail interest rates uniformly across markets, have different operating costs, and have access to wholesale funding. If LMBs have significant funding advantages that offset potential loan operating cost disadvantages, then market-extension mergers by LMBs promote loan competition, especially in concen- trated markets. However, such mergers reduce retail deposit competition, especially in less concentrated markets. Prior empirical research and our own analysis of retail deposit rates support the model's predictions.]

This article shows that risk-based deposit insurance premiums generate smaller procyclical effects than do risk-based capital requirements. Thus, Basel II's procyclical impact can be reduced by integrating risk-based deposit insurance. If deposit insurance is structured as a moving average of contracts, its procyclical effects can be decreased further. Empirical illustrations of this are presented for 42 banks over the period 1987 to 1996. The results confirm that lengthening the contracts' maturities intertemporally smooths premiums but raises the average premium level needed to compensate the insurer for greater systematic risk. The distribution of risk-based premiums across banks is skewed.

Trading losses associated with information asymmetries can be mitigated by designing securities that split the cash flows of underlying assets. These securities, which can arise endogenously, have values that do not depend on the information known only to informed agents. Bank debt (deposits) is an example of this type of liquid security that protects relatively uninformed agents, and the authors provide a rationale for deposit insurance in this content. High-grade corporate debt and government bonds are other examples, implying that a money market mutual fund based payments system may be an alternative to one based on insured bank deposits.

[We develop a model of nominal and real bond yield curves that has four stochastic drivers but seven factors: three factors primarily determine the cross-section of yields, whereas four volatility factors solely determine risk premia. The model is estimated using nominal Treasury yields, survey inflation forecasts, and inflation swap rates and has attractive empirical properties. Time-varying volatility is particularly apparent in shortterm real rates and expected inflation. Also, we detail the different economic forces that drive short-and long-term real and inflation risk premia and provide evidence that Treasury inflation-protected securities were undervalued prior to 2004 and during the recent financial crisis.]

In the context of an equilibrium asset-pricing model, the dynamics of the instantaneous real interest rate and the instantaneous rate of expected inflation are estimated. Unlike previous models, we allow real interest rates and inflation to be mutually dependent processes. The model is estimated as a state-space system that includes observations on various maturity Treasury bills and NBER-ASA survey forecasts of inflation. Over the period 1968-88, we find evidence that instantaneous real interest rates and expected inflation are significantly negatively correlated. Real interest rates also display greater volatility and weaker mean reversion than expected inflation. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

Like security prices, retail deposit interest rates cluster around integers and “even” fractions. However, explanations for security price clustering are incompatible with deposit rate clustering. A theory based on the limited recall of retail depositors is proposed. It predicts that banks tend to set rates at integers and that rates are “sticky” at these levels. The propensity for integer rates increases with the level of wholesale interest rates and deposit market concentration. When banks set noninteger rates, rates are more likely to be just above, rather than just below, integers. The paper finds substantial empirical support for the theory's implications.

This paper considers a model where banks may improve the returns on loans by monitoring borrowers. Bank regulation, together with competitive deposit and equity financing, can give banks an incentive to sell loans, but the extent of their loan selling is limited by a moral-hazard problem. A solution is given for the optimal design of the bank-loan buyer contract that alleviates this moral-hazard problem. An explanation is also given as to why some banks might buy loans and why loan sales volume has recently increased.