We examine the rationality of investor exercise behavior by analyzing two years' tendered exercise notices for Treasury bond futures options. We conclude that exercise behavior is generally rational, but document numerous failures to exercise as well as some exercises that should not have occured, both at and prior to expiration. The most frequent type of error is failing to exercise, suggesting that traders do not monitor their positions with sufficient care. Finally, we show that investors use information arriving after trading closes, but before exchange-imposed exercise deadlines, in forming their exercise decisions.

This paper investigates the effect of share repurchase through transferable put rights (TPRs) on shareholder wealth and corporate control. Transferable put rights make the put option, which is implicit in a tender offer, marketable. Shareholders who do not tender their shares increase their proportional ownership of the firm and extract some of the gains of the tender offer from exiting shareholders. Finally, TPRs improve tax efficiency by ensuring that only shareholders who have the highest tax bases will tender.