The existence of default risk is an important characteristic of most lending operations, and many of the studies dealing with lending behavior incorporate default risk considerations. Two basic approaches to the modeling of such behavior can be identified according to their treatment of default probabilities: the first approach assumes that the likelihood of default is independent of the actions of the lender under consideration, namely, the volume of the loan granted by the current lender has no impact on the default probability (e.g., the works by Yawitz [9], Feder and Just [3], and Bierman and Hass [2]). Such an assumption may be quite appropriate in situations where the volume of operations of a single lender is rather small relative to the size of borrower's assets (or previous debt), as is the case with most bond buyers or with banks who lend to sovereign borrowers.

This paper examines the behavior of a competitive firm under price uncertainty where a futures market exists for the commodity produced by the firm. Working with the Sandmo approach, we found that production decisions depend only on the futures market price and input costs; the subjective distribution of future spot price affects only the firm's involvement in futures trading. Conditions are then determined under which a firm will either hedge, speculate by buying futures contracts, or speculate by selling futures contracts. The results indicate that an important social benefit derived from the existence of a futures market is to eliminate output fluctuations due to variation in producers' subjective distributions of future spot price.