Only recently the debate on bank capital regulation has devoted specific attention to the role that bank loan loss provisions can play as a part of the overall capital regulatory framework. This paper contributes to the ongoing debate by demonstrating empirically that loan loss provisioning needs to be an integral component of capital regulation. We find empirical evidence that many banks around the world delay provisioning for bad loans until too late, when cyclical downturns have already set in, thereby magnifying the impact of the economic cycle on banks' income and capital.

We investigate the effect of judicial efficiency on banks’ lending spreads for a large cross-section of countries. We measure bank interest rate spreads for 106 countries at the country level and for 32 countries at the level of individual banks. We find that judicial efficiency and inflation rates are the main drivers of interest rate spreads across countries. Our results suggest that improvements in judicial efficiency and judicial enforcement of debt contracts are critical to lowering the cost of financial intermediation for households and firms.

We test for emerging economies the hypothesis – previously verified for G-10 countries only – that the enforcement of bank capital asset requirements (CARs) curtails the supply of credit. The econometric analysis on individual bank data suggests three main results. First, CAR enforcement significantly trimmed credit supply, particularly at less-well capitalized banks. Second, the negative impact has been larger for countries enforcing CARs in the aftermath of a currency/financial crisis. Third, the adverse impact of CARs has been somewhat smaller for foreign-owned banks, suggesting that opening up to foreign investors may have partly shielded the domestic banking sector from negative shocks. Overall, CAR enforcement – inducing banks to reduce their lending – may have had both beneficial and detrimental effects. On one hand, it may have reduced ill-advised lending – possibly induced by banks' exploitation of the public safety net – and this is desirable. On the other hand, CAR enforcement may have induced an aggregate credit slowdown or contraction in the examined emerging countries, thus exacerbating liquidity constraints and negatively affecting real activity. This paper is relevant to the ongoing debate on the impact of the revision of bank CARs, as contemplated by the new Basel proposal. Our results suggest that in several emerging economies the revision of bank CARs could well induce a credit supply retrenchment, which should not be underestimated.

We assess the potential impact for non-high-income countries (NHICs) of linking bank capital asset requirements (CARs) to private sector ratings–as contemplated by the new Basel proposal. Specifically, we show that linking bank CARs to external ratings would have a series of undesirable effects for NHICs. First, since ratings are by far less widespread for banks and corporations in NHICs, bank CARs would be practically insensitive to improvements in the quality of assets, widening the gap between banks of equal financial strength located in higher and lower income countries. Second, bank and corporate ratings in NHICs (as opposed to their homologues in high-income countries) are strongly linked to their sovereign ratings. This would expose bank capital requirements in NHICs to the same “pro-cyclical” swings, which have characterized sovereign rating revision in the recent crisis episodes. We conclude that linking bank CARs to private sector ratings would worsen the availability and cost of credit to NHICs – with potential negative effects on the level of economic activity – and suggest that a reassessment of the Basel proposal may help to avoid such undesired consequences.

We explore for individual banks, active in the East Asian countries during the years 1996–1998, the performance of three sets of indicators of bank fragility that can be computed from publicly available information: accounting data, stock market prices, and credit ratings. We find significantly different patterns among the three groups of indicators in their ability of forecasting financial distress at a specific point in time and over time. More specifically, in the East Asia crisis episode the information based on stock prices or on judgmental assessments of credit rating agencies did not outpace backward looking information contained in balance sheet data. Stock market based information, though, has responded more quickly to changing financial conditions than ratings of credit risk agencies. Overall, the evidence supports the policy conclusion that, where the information processing is quite costly, as in most developing countries, it is important to use simultaneously a plurality of indicators to assess bank fragility.