Governments face conflicting objectives in terms of the provision and design of safety nets for banking systems. Safety nets may reduce market discipline and can thus increase the likelihood of a banking crisis. But safety nets are adopted because of the perceived benefits they will confer in either preventing a weak banking system from spilling over into a full-blown crisis or in enabling the government to handle a crisis more effectively. This paper provides evidence on the effects of government safety nets on both these aspects and discusses implications for policy.

This paper assesses the cross country `stylised facts' on empirical measures of the losses incurred during periods of banking crises. We first consider the direct resolution costs to the government and then the broader costs to the welfare of the economy – proxied by losses in GDP. We find that the cumulative output losses incurred during crisis periods are large, roughly 15–20%, on average, of annual GDP. In contrast to previous research, we also find that output losses incurred during crises in developed countries are as high, or higher, on average, than those in emerging-market economies. Moreover, output losses during crisis periods in developed countries also appear to be significantly larger – 10–15% – than in neighbouring countries that did not at the time experience severe banking problems. In emerging-market economies, by contrast, banking crises appear to be costly only when accompanied by a currency crisis. These results seem robust to allowing for macroeconomic conditions at the outset of crisis – in particular low and declining output growth – that have also contributed to future output losses during crises episodes.