Lawrence D. Brown, Gordon D. Richardson, Steven J. Schwager, An Information Interpretation of Financial Analyst Superiority in Forecasting Earnings, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Spring, 1987), pp. 49-67

Two standard‐setting approaches have emerged globally to guide the choice of accounting for securitizations: the control and components approach ( SFAS No. 125 and SFAS No. 140 ) and the risks and rewards transfer approach ( IAS No. 39 ). A lack of consensus about derecognition accounting is a major impediment to achieving convergence in global standards that must be resolved. Thus, both SFAS No. 140 and IAS No. 39 will be reexamined, and evidence pertinent to the debate is timely and important. In this study, we present evidence consistent with the view of credit‐rating analysts, who view many securitizations as, in substance, secured borrowings. Specifically, for a sample of originators applying sale accounting guidance in SFAS No. 125 / 140 during the period 1997‐2003, we show that off‐balance‐sheet debt related to securitizations has, on average, the same risk‐relevance for explaining market measures of risk (that is, CAPM beta) as on‐balance‐sheet debt. We also find that, in a returns and earnings association framework, the pricing multiple on securitization gains declines as the amount of off‐balance‐sheet debt increases, implying that investors take off‐balance‐sheet debt into account when assessing the valuation‐relevance of such gains. For those who advocate the control and components approach to securitization accounting, our results suggest that, at least for frequent securitizers, the put option arising from implicit recourse is a “missing piece” that is not currently accounted for when calculating securitization gains. Our results challenge the extant measurement standards in SFAS No. 140 .

The decision to disclose information concerning a firm's environmental liabilities is modeled as a sequential game involving the firm, a capital market, and outside stakeholders who can impose proprietary (political) costs on the firm. A partial disclosure equilibrium is derived in which firms reveal information strategically, maximizing the share‐value net of expected political costs. Inherent uncertainty regarding the existence and size of the liabilities creates a setting where outsiders are uncertain if management is informed about these liabilities, so firms can plausibly withhold “bad news”, that is, they do not disclose liabilities that exceed a threshold level. Three novel hypotheses are that a firm is more likely to disclose as (1) its pollution propensity increases, (2) outsiders' knowledge of its environmental liabilities increases, and (3) the risk of incurring proprietary costs decreases. Empirical support is found for the hypotheses, based on the accounting disclosures made by sample firms selected from the records of the Ontario Ministry of the Environment and Energy. Improved accounting and auditing standards for environmental disclosure would build on at least three implications of the study: To the extent that inherent uncertainty leaves managers with discretion as to what to disclose, the partial disclosure equilibrium result suggests that not all firms will comply with disclosure standards. Publishing broad environmental performance indicators for companies in nonaccounting outlets would increase public awareness of a manager's private information endowment, making voluntary accounting disclosures of the liabilities more likely. If a significant decline in stakeholder tolerance of pollution occurs, the expected proprietary costs of disclosing increase, and companies become less likely to disclose.

The objective of this study is to investigate the role, if any, that management discussion and analysis (MD&A) plays in a firm's disclosure package. First, we present evidence regarding the usefulness of MD&A. Our evidence is uniformly supportive of the view that MD&A is a source of new and useful information and indicates that MD&A is used for financial analysis purposes by at least one significant user group, sell‐side analysts, who are members of the Toronto Society of Financial Analysts. We then provide evidence on disclosure quality. The results reveal that, overall, MD&A disclosure quality varies with disclosure stimuli similar to those found to influence disclosure choice in other disclosure channels. However, a more refined analysis of the MD&A subcomponents reveals that different factors influence disclosure quality for those subcomponents. Taken together, our results are consistent with the notion that MD&A is a part of a firm's overall disclosure package.

In this study, we appeal to theories advanced by Darrough and Stoughton (1990) to enhance our understanding of why some firms may voluntarily include directional forecasts in their annual reports while others do not. The data are consistent with their predictions that a firm's disclosure policy reflects its concern for both financial market valuation and product market competition. We find that for “good news firms, the probability of forecasting is increasing in the financing requirements but decreasing in the threat of competitor entry. The converse holds for “bad news” firms. These results lend further empirical support to the observation that the familiar good news hypothesis tested in the management earnings forecast literature offers only a partial explanation for the decision to forecast. Interestingly, however, even after controlling for financial and product market considerations, an overall voluntary disclosure bias still exists in the data. The data also provide support for the OSC's concern about a voluntary disclosure bias. Only 17.5 percent of our sample forecasts represent revisions downward relative to the previous year's results. However, in contrast to the OSC's concern about a general lack of forward‐looking disclosures in annual reports, 35.9 percent of our sample firms include directional forecasts in their MD&A or elsewhere in the annual report.

Résumé. Les auteurs font appel aux théories proposées par Darrough et Stoughton (1990) afin de mieux comprendre pourquoi certaines entreprises incorporent volontairement des prévisions directionnelles à leurs rapports annuels alors que d'autres s'en abstiennent. Les données qu'ils recueillent sont conformes à leurs prédictions selon lesquelles la politique d'information d'une entreprise reflète ses préoccupations à l'égard de la cote d'évaluation que lui attribue le marché des capitaux et à l'égard de la concurrence à laquelle elle doit faire face sur le marché des produits. Les auteurs constatent que pour les entreprises dont l'information est favorable, la probabilité de produire de l'information prévisionnelle croît lorsque l'entreprise a besoin de capitaux, mais décroît lorsqu'un nouveau concurrent menace d'entrer sur le marché. L'inverse est vrai pour les entreprises dont l'information est défavorable. Ces résultats viennent étayer plus solidement, sur le plan empirique, l'observation selon laquelle l'hypothèse familière de l'information favorable vérifiée dans les travaux portant sur la prévision des résultats par la direction n'offre qu'une explication partielle à la décision de produire de l'information prévisionnelle. Chose intéressante, toutefois, même une fois contrôlés les facteurs relatifs au marché des capitaux et au marché des produits, les données révèlent toujours une distorsion globale dans la présentation volontaire d'information. Elles viennent également légitimer les préoccupations de la CVMO à l'égard de cette distorsion dans la présentation volontaire d'information. Seulement 17,5 pour cent des prévisions de l'échantillon sélectionné par les auteurs indiquent une baisse par rapport aux résultats de l'exercice précédent. Toutefois, par contraste avec les préoccupations de la CVMO en ce qui a trait à l'absence générale d'information prospective dans les rapports annuels, 35,9 pour cent des entreprises de l'échantillon constitué par les auteurs incorporent des prévisions directionnelles à leur rapport de gestion ou à d'autres sections de leur rapport annuel.

Strong‐form efficiency on the Toronto Stock Exchange is examined by focusing on the stock price forecasts of brokerage‐firm analysts who follow TSE firms. Two principal analyses are undertaken. First, there is considerable evidence in both the U.S. and U.K. that analysts possess valuable private information at the firm‐specific level. This paper provides evidence that this finding is generalizable to Canadian analysts. Second, U.S. and U.K. studies generally have been based on a single‐factor model (e.g., the CAPM). The choice of benchmarks (CAPM versus APT) has been shown to be important in a variety of contexts. We provide evidence that the choice of benchmark does not alter the fundamental conclusion that Canadian analysts possess valuable private information at the firm‐specific level. Our findings have implications for accounting researchers, namely, the appropriateness of researchers to use CAPM in lieu of the computationally, more burdensome APT and the appropriateness of researchers to use Canadian analyst forecasts when a proxy is required for the (unobservable) market expectation. Résumé. Les auteurs examinent l'efficience « forte » de la Bourse de Toronto, en s'intéressant aux prévisions relatives au prix des actions formulées par les analystes des sociétés de courtage qui suivent les entreprises de la Bourse de Toronto. Deux analyses principales les mènent aux conclusions suivantes. Premièrement, les faits démontrent presque indubitablement que sur le marché des États‐Unis aussi bien que sur celui du Royaume‐Uni, les analystes possèdent de l'information à caractère privé utile, spécifique à l'entreprise. Les résultats de l'étude démontrent que cette constatation peut être généralisée aux analystes canadiens. Deuxièmement, les études des États‐Unis et du Royaume‐Uni sont généralement fondées sur un modèle à un seul facteur (le modèle d'équilibre des marchés financiers, par exemple). Il a été établi que le choix des critères (le modèle d'équilibre des marchés financiers ou la théorie de l'établissement des prix par arbitrage) est important dans des circonstances très diverses. Les auteurs démontrent que le choix des critères n'a aucune incidence sur la conclusion fondamentale selon laquelle les analystes canadiens possèdent de l'information à caractère privé utile, spécifique à l'entreprise. Les résultats de leur étude entrainent certaines conséquences pour les chercheurs du domaine de la comptabilité: ils ont avantage à utiliser le modèle d'équilibre des marchés financiers de préférence à la théorie de l'établissement des prix par arbitrage, qui exige davantage de calculs, et à recourir aux prévisions des analystes canadiens lorsqu'il leur faut un substitut aux anticipations du marché (qui ne peuvent étre observées).

The objective of this study is to examine the market valuation of environmental capital expenditure investment related to pollution abatement in the pulp and paper industry. The total environmental capital expenditure of $8.7 billion by our sample firms during 1989–2000 supports the focus on this industry. In order to be capitalized, an asset should be associated with future economic benefits. The existing environmental literature suggests that investors condition their evaluation of the future economic benefits arising from environmental capital expenditure on an assessment of the firms' environmental performance. This literature predicts the emergence of two environmental stereotypes: low-polluting firms that overcomply with existing environmental regulations, and high-polluting firms that just meet minimal environmental requirements. Our valuation evidence indicates that there are incremental economic benefits associated with environmental capital expenditure investment by low-polluting firms but not high-polluting firms. We also find that investors use environmental performance information to assess unbooked environmental liabilities, which we interpret to represent the future abatement spending obligations of high-polluting firms in the pulp and paper industry. We estimate average unbooked liabilities of $560 million for high-polluting firms, or 16.6 percent of market capitalization.

Recently, Penman and Sougiannis (1998) and Francis, Olsson, and Oswald (2000) compared the bias and accuracy of the discounted cash flow model (DCF) and Edwards‐Bell‐Ohlson residual income model (RIM) in explaining the relation between value estimates and observed stock prices. Both studies report that, with non‐price‐based terminal values, RIM outperforms DCF. Our first research objective is to explore the question whether, over a five‐year valuation horizon, DCF and RIM are empirically equivalent when Penman's (1997) theoretically “ideal” terminal value expressions are employed in each model. Using Value Line terminal stock price forecasts at the horizon to proxy for such values, we find empirical support for the prediction of equivalence between these valuation models. Thus, the apparent superiority of RIM does not hold in a level playing field comparison. Our second research objective is to demonstrate that, within each class of the DCF and RIM valuation models, the model that employs Value Line forecasted price in the terminal value expression generates the lowest prediction errors, compared with models that employ non‐price‐based terminal values under arbitrary growth assumptions. The results indicate that, for both DCF and RIM, price‐based valuation models outperform the corresponding non‐price‐based models by a wide margin. These results imply that researchers should exercise care in interpreting findings from models using ad hoc terminal value expressions.