Gordon Sick, Discussion: Asymmetric Information, Signaling, and Optimal Corporate Financial Decisions, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 4, Proceedings of 16th Annual Conference of the Western Finance Association, June 18-20, 1981, Jackson Hole, Wyoming (Nov., 1981), pp. 437-438

Alan Kraus, Gordon A. Sick, Communication of Aggregate Preferences Through Market Prices, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 14, No. 4, Proceedings of 14th Annual Conference of the Western Finance Association, June 21-23, 1979 (Nov., 1979), pp. 695-703

ABSTRACT In a recent article, MacMinn [5] argues that the presence of forward markets eliminates the incentives of the firm's manager to choose production levels that maximize firm value. In this comment, we show that his results do not depend on the presence of forward markets. The critical assumptions are that the manager is endowed with money rather than stock in the firm and that there is no competitive labor market for managers. In addition, his results require time‐inconsistent behavior on the part of the firm's manager.