This paper demonstrates that the option to move in and out of the parental home is a valuable insurance channel against labor market risk, which facilitates the pursuit of jobs with the potential for high earnings growth. Using monthly panel data, I document an empirical relationship among coresidence, individual labor market events, and subsequent earnings growth. I estimate the parameters of a dynamic game between youths and parents to show that the option to live at home can account for features of aggregate data for low-skilled young workers: small consumption responses to shocks, high labor elasticities, and low savings rates.

A wide body of empirical evidence finds that around 25 percent of fiscal stimulus payments (e.g., tax rebates) are spent on nondurable household consumption in the quarter that they are received.To interpret this fact, we develop a structural economic model where households can hold two assets: a low-return liquid asset (e.g., cash, checking account) and a high-return illiquid asset that carries a transaction cost (e.g., housing, retirement account).The optimal life-cycle pattern of portfolio choice implies that many households in the model are "wealthy hand-to-mouth": they hold little or no liquid wealth despite owning sizeable quantities of illiquid assets.They therefore display large propensities to consume out of additional transitory income, and small propensities to consume out of news about future income.We document the existence of such households in data from the Survey of Consumer Finances.A version of the model parameterized to the 2001 tax rebate episode yields consumption responses to fiscal stimulus payments that are in line with the evidence, and an order of magnitude larger than in the standard "one-asset" framework.The model's nonlinearities with respect to the size of the rebate, its degree of phasing-out, and aggregate economic conditions have implications for policy design.

Fiscal stimulus payments (i.e., direct lump-sum payments from the government to households) were used in the recessions of 2001 and 2008 in an attempt to simultaneously alleviate households' economic hardship and stimulate aggregate demand. Despite the similarities between the two stimulus policies, there were important differences in both their design and the prevailing economic conditions. We use the model of Kaplan and Violante (2013) to compare the consumption response to these policies. Consistent with empirical evidence from microdata, we find that the consumption response was around one-third lower in 2008, primarily due to the larger size of the payments.

How sensitive to business cycles are the earnings of top earners? And, how does the business cycle sensitivity of top earners vary by industry? We use a confidential dataset on earnings histories of US males from the Social Security Administration. On average, individuals in the top 1 percent of the earnings distribution are slightly more cyclical than the population average. But there are large differences across sectors; top earners in Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (FIRE) and Construction face substantial business cycle volatility, whereas those in Services (who make up 40 percent of individuals in the top 1 percent) have earnings that are less cyclical than the average worker.

We revisit the transmission mechanism from monetary policy to household consumption in a Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian (HANK) model. The model yields empirically realistic distributions of wealth and marginal propensities to consume because of two features: uninsurable income shocks and multiple assets with different degrees of liquidity and different returns. In this environment, the indirect effects of an unexpected cut in interest rates, which operate through a general equilibrium increase in labor demand, far outweigh direct effects such as intertemporal substitution. This finding is in stark contrast to small- and medium-scale Representative Agent New Keynesian (RANK) economies, where the substitution channel drives virtually all of the transmission from interest rates to consumption. Failure of Ricardian equivalence implies that, in HANK models, the fiscal reaction to the monetary expansion is a key determinant of the overall size of the macroeconomic response.

We use survey questions about spending in hypothetical scenarios to investigate features of propensities to consume that are useful for distinguishing between consumption theories. We find that (1) responses to unanticipated gains are vastly heterogeneous (either zero or substantially positive); (2) responses increase in the size of the gain, driven by the extensive margin of spending adjustments; (3) responses to losses are much larger and more widespread than responses to gains; and (4) even those with large responses to gains do not respond to news about future gains. These four findings suggest that limited access to disposable resources, and frictions in adjusting consumption, are important determinants of consumption behaviour. We also find that (5) households do not respond to the offer of a one-year interest-free loan, suggesting that this is not a consequence of short-term credit constraints; and (6) people do cut spending in response to news about future losses, suggesting that neither is this a consequence of myopia. A calibrated precautionary savings model with utility costs of changing consumption, and a sufficient fraction of low-wealth households, can account for these features of propensities to consume on both the extensive and intensive margins.

We propose a theory of self-fulfilling unemployment fluctuations. When a firm increases its workforce, it raises demand and weakens competition facing other firms, as employed workers spend more and have less time to search for low prices than unemployed workers. These effects induce other firms to hire more labor in order to scale up their presence in the product market. The feedback between employment and product market conditions generates multiple equilibria—and the possibility of self-fulfilling fluctuations—if differences in shopping behavior between employed and unemployed are large enough. Evidence on spending, shopping, and prices suggests that this is the case.

We build a model of the U.S. economy with multiple aggregate shocks (income, housing finance conditions, and beliefs about future housing demand) that generate fluctuations in equilibrium house prices. Through a series of counterfactual experiments, we study the housing boom and bust around the Great Recession and obtain three main results. First, we find that the main driver of movements in house prices and rents was a shift in beliefs. Shifts in credit conditions do not move house prices but are important for the dynamics of home ownership, leverage, and foreclosures. The role of housing rental markets and long-term mortgages in alleviating credit constraints is central to these findings. Second, our model suggests that the boom-bust in house prices explains half of the corresponding swings in non-durable expenditures and that the transmission mechanism is a wealth effect through household balance sheets. Third, we find that a large-scale debt forgiveness program would have done little to temper the collapse of house prices and expenditures, but would have dramatically reduced foreclosures and induced a small, but persistent, increase in consumption during the recovery.