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The allocation of catastrophe risk

Journal of Banking & Finance 2002 26(2-3), 585-596
The potential losses from catastrophes have led financial researchers to address the following questions: (1) to what extent is catastrophe risk being shared (insured) and is the allocation of catastrophe risk consistent with notions of optimal risk sharing? (2) if not, what market imperfections hinder the efficient allocation of catastrophe risk? and (3) are there government policies or private market solutions that could lead to a more efficient allocation of catastrophe risk? This paper summarizes the research that has been conducted on these questions.

Capital, corporate income taxes, and catastrophe insurance

Journal of Financial Intermediation 2003 12(4), 365-389
We provide estimates of the equity capital needed and the resulting tax costs incurred when supplying catastrophe insurance/reinsurance using a partial equilibrium model that incorporates a specific loss distribution for US catastrophe losses. After consideration of insurer investment in tax-exempt securities, tax loss carry-back/forward provisions, and personal taxes, our results imply that the tax costs of equity finance alone have a substantial effect on the cost of supplying catastrophe reinsurance. These results help explain a variety of industry developments that reduce tax costs. Also, when coupled with non-tax costs of capital, these results help explain the limited scope of catastrophe insurance/reinsurance.

The Role of ESOPs in Takeover Contests

Journal of Finance 1994 49(4), 1451-1470
This article examines both the shareholder wealth effects of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) announced by firms subject to takeover pressure and the takeover incidence of targets with and without ESOPs. Although we do not find that defensive ESOPs significantly reduce shareholder wealth on average, we identify two factors—the change in managerial and employee ownership due to the ESOP and the simultaneous announcement of other defensive tactics—that are associated with negative stock price reactions. We find that ESOPs are strong deterrents to takeover. ESOP targets that are acquired earn higher returns than targets without ESOPs, but the difference is not statistically significant.

The Role of Esops in Takeover Contests.

Journal of Finance 1994 49(4), 1451-70
This article examines both the shareholder wealth effects of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) announced by firms subject to takeover pressure and the takeover incidence of targets with and without ESOPs. Although we do not find that defensive ESOPs significantly reduce shareholder wealth on average, we identify two factors - the change in managerial and employee ownership due to the ESOP and the simultaneous announcement of other defensive tactics - that are associated with negative stock price reactions. We find that ESOPs are strong deterrents to takeover. ESOP targets that are acquired earn higher returns than targets without ESOPs, but the difference is not statistically significant.

The Role of ESOPs in Takeover Contests

Journal of Finance 1994 49(4), 1451
This article examines both the shareholder wealth effects of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) announced by firms subject to takeover pressure and the takeover incidence of targets with and without ESOPs. Although we do not find that defensive ESOPs significantly reduce shareholder wealth on average, we identify two factors—the change in managerial and employee ownership due to the ESOP and the simultaneous announcement of other defensive tactics—that are associated with negative stock price reactions. We find that ESOPs are strong deterrents to takeover. ESOP targets that are acquired earn higher returns than targets without ESOPs, but the difference is not statistically significant.

Employee buyouts: causes, structure, and consequences1The authors appreciate the helpful comments received from Edward Rice (the referee), Clifford Smith (the editor), Tom George, N.R. Prahbala, Greg Roth, Anil Shivdasani, Neil Sicherman, Luigi Zingales, the seminar participants at Harvard University, Michigan State University, the Universities of Georgia, Pittsburgh, and South Carolina, the 1994 Financial Management Association Meeting, the 1994 Western Finance Association Meeting, the research assistance of Rohan Christie-David, Andy Saporoschenko, Tom Smythe, and Cynthia McDonald.1

Journal of Financial Economics 1998 48(3), 283-332
This paper investigates the motivations for and consequences of including a broad group of employees in leveraged buyouts by comparing employee buyouts (EBOs) to transactions where only top level managers participate, or management buyouts (MBOs). We examine the implications of including employees in a buyout from a labor contracting, financing, and management control point of view. A major finding is that employee participation helps to finance the buyout. The EBO allows firms to gain access to excess pension assets by converting employees' defined benefit pension capital into equity claims, thus freeing the excess assets in the pension plan to help fund the buyout. Also, employee participation substitutes equity claims for cash labor compensation costs and therefore allows the firm to borrow more than otherwise would be possible. There is also evidence consistent with managers including employees to maintain or enhance incumbent management's control.

The impact of sell-side analyst research coverage on an affiliated broker’s market share of trading volume

Journal of Banking & Finance 2010 34(4), 776-787
Using NASDAQ reported individual stock level trading volume, we find that analyst research coverage on a stock increases the level of an affiliated broker’s market share of trading volume in that stock by 0.8 percent, on average, which corresponds to an additional annual volume of about one million shares in an average stock. Optimistic recommendations increase the level of market share by an additional 0.3 percent, on average, which is consistent with the notion that analysts have an incentive to issue optimistic recommendations. Also, a broker’s market share of volume increases on average when an affiliated analyst changes his/her recommendation, and decreases with the length of time during which an analyst maintains the same recommendation on a stock. The latter findings suggest that sell-side institutions are rewarded for providing new information to the market and for ongoing research services.

Market discipline and policy loans

Journal of Banking & Finance 2024 159, 107076
We examine the conditions under which life insurer customers can use a policy loan to protect the unguaranteed cash value in their life insurance policies and annuity contracts from insurer insolvency, and thereby provide market discipline for life insurers. Consistent with policyholders using policy loans to protect their cash value, our empirical evidence indicates that insurers’ policy loan growth rates are negatively associated with measures of insurers’ financial strength, specifically their capital ratios. We also find evidence that the negative association is stronger for insurers that focus on selling annuities.

Management turnover in subsidiaries of conglomerates versus stand-alone firms

Journal of Financial Economics 2004 72(1), 63-96
We compare turnover of subsidiary managers inside conglomerate firms to turnover of CEOs of comparable stand-alone firms. We find that, compared to turnover of CEOs, subsidiary manager turnover is significantly more sensitive to changes in performance and significantly more likely following poor performance. For subsidiary managers, the relation between turnover and performance is significantly stronger when the subsidiary operates in an industry that is related to the parent's primary industry. Results suggest that boards of directors are relatively ineffective disciplinarians of CEOs and despite their other apparent failings, conglomerate firms have relatively strict disciplining mechanisms for subsidiary managers.