[I provide a revealed-preference-based framework that uses covenant prices and choices to quantitatively study how covenants generate firm benefits by completing debt contracts. I use a rational-expectations-based panel estimator of covenant prices, which does not require quasi-experimental variation, to circumvent the problem of endogenous covenant choices. I find that firms' surpluses exceed the spread paid on a loan. Leverage and interest-rate covenants produce the largest benefits, lending quantitative credence to several standard theories of covenants. Once covenants are chosen, the benefits from fine-tuning them are small, thus rationalizing "boilerplate" covenants. I conclude by discussing the extensions and limitations of my method.]

I provide a revealed-preference-based framework that uses covenant prices and choices to quantitatively study how covenants generate firm benefits by completing debt contracts. I use a rational-expectations-based panel estimator of covenant prices, which does not require quasi-experimental variation, to circumvent the problem of endogenous covenant choices. I find that firms' surpluses exceed the spread paid on a loan. Leverage and interest-rate covenants produce the largest benefits, lending quantitative credence to several standard theories of covenants. Once covenants are chosen, the benefits from fine-tuning them are small, thus rationalizing “boilerplate” covenants. I conclude by discussing the extensions and limitations of my method.

[Financial distress can disrupt a durable goods producer's provision of complementary goods and services such as warranties, spare parts and maintenance. This reduces consumers' demand for the core product, causing indirect costs of financial distress. We test this hypothesis in the market for used cars sold at wholesale auctions. An increase in a manufacturer's credit default swaps significantly decreases the prices of its cars at auction, especially cars with longer expected service lives. Our estimates imply substantial indirect costs of financial distress for car manufacturers. These costs have occasionally even exceeded the tax savings benefits for General Motors and Ford.]

Financial distress can disrupt a durable goods producer's provision of complementary goods and services such as warranties, spare parts and maintenance. This reduces consumers' demand for the core product, causing indirect costs of financial distress. We test this hypothesis in the market for used cars sold at wholesale auctions. An increase in a manufacturer's credit default swaps significantly decreases the prices of its cars at auction, especially cars with longer expected service lives. Our estimates imply substantial indirect costs of financial distress for car manufacturers. These costs have occasionally even exceeded the tax savings benefits for General Motors and Ford.