This paper investigates the press's role as a monitor or “watchdog” for accounting fraud. I find that the press fulfills this role by rebroadcasting information from other information intermediaries (analysts, auditors, and lawsuits) and by undertaking original investigation and analysis. Articles based on original analysis provide new information to the markets while those that rebroadcast allegations from other intermediaries do not. Consistent with a dual role for the press, I find that business‐oriented press is more likely to undertake original analysis while nonbusiness periodicals focus primarily on rebroadcasting. I also investigate the determinates of press coverage, finding systematic biases in the types of firms and frauds for which articles are published. In general, the press covers firms and frauds that will be of interest to a broad set of readers and situations that are lower cost to identify and investigate.

While the influence of earnings performance on disclosure is a fundamental issue in the disclosure literature, our understanding of this influence is limited. In this paper, I examine a comprehensive set of disclosures from a sample of firms experiencing an extended period of seasonally adjusted earnings increases. I study how these firms adjust disclosure in response to earnings increases, how disclosure changes as the period of strong earnings performance nears an end and how firms disclose during a subsequent period of earnings decline. I find an increase in disclosure during the period of increased earnings. This increase is pervasive across all types of disclosure and tends to be bundled with earnings announcements. The market responds positively to this disclosure. Firms continue to disclose at a high level as they approach earnings declines. However, they shift to disclosures that focus on the positive short‐term results and do not discuss the impending decreases. While this behavior is systematic, the market does not appear to anticipate the subsequent earnings declines. Once the firms announce earnings declines, the magnitude of disclosure returns to the level provided prior to the increased earnings.

[This paper explores the determinants of the valuation allowance for deferred tax assets under SFAS No. 109. We find that, consistent with SFAS No. 109, the allowance is larger for firms with relatively more deferred tax assets and smaller for firms with higher levels of expected future taxable income. The most important explanatory variable for the valuation allowance is the level of firms' tax credit and tax loss carryforwards, consistent with these items being more difficult to realize. We find little evidence that managers use the valuation allowance for earnings management purposes, although these tests may not be very powerful.]

This paper examines the characteristics of management forecasts available on Thomson First Call’s Company Issued Guidance (CIG) database relative to a sample of forecasts hand-collected through a search of company press releases. Due to the significantly lower cost of using CIG (relative to hand-collecting data), academics have increasingly relied on this database as a source of management forecasts. However, it is important for researchers to consider the properties of this database (such as coverage, accuracy, and breadth) when evaluating whether it is an appropriate data source for their study. Overall, our results suggest systematic differences between forecasts reported on CIG and forecasts gathered from company press releases. We suggest several sample criteria that will remove or mitigate these biases.

Recent changes in technology and the media are causing significant changes in how capital markets assimilate and respond to information. We identify important themes in the disclosure literature and use this as a framework to discuss the conference papers that appear in this volume. These papers examine how managers’ disclosure practices are being affected by changes in technology, the media, and capital markets. While this work makes important progress, we discuss how continuing technological change and the emergence of new forms of media offer further opportunities for research on the role of disclosure in capital markets.

We investigate managers' decisions to supplement their firms' management earnings forecasts. We classify these supplementary disclosures as qualitative “soft talk” disclosures or verifiable forward‐looking statements. We find that managers provide soft talk disclosures with similar frequency for good and bad news forecasts but are more likely to supplement good news forecasts with verifiable forward‐looking statements. We examine the market response to these forecasts and find that bad news earnings forecasts are always informative but that good news forecasts are informative only when supplemented by verifiable forward‐looking statements, supporting our argument that these statements bolster the credibility of good news forecasts.

We examine the actions and outcomes of investor relations (IR) programs in smaller, less-visible firms. Through interviews with IR professionals, we learn that IR strategies have a common goal of attracting institutional investors and that direct access to management, rather than increased disclosure, is viewed as the key driver of the strategy's success. We test for the effects of IR programs by examining small-cap companies that hired IR firms in a differences-in-differences research design with controls for changes in disclosure and determinants of the decision to initiate IR. Relative to a matched sample of control firms, we find that companies initiating IR programs exhibit greater increases in institutional investor ownership and a shift toward investors that normally would not follow the companies. We also find greater improvements in analyst following, media coverage, and the book-to-price ratio. Our results indicate that IR activities successfully improve visibility, investor following, and market value. Data Availability: All analyses are based on publicly available data.

This paper explores the determinants of the valuation allowance for deferred tax assets under SFAS No.109. We find that, consistent with SFAS No. 109, the allowance is larger for firms with relatively more deferred tax assets and smaller for firms with higher levels of expected future taxable income. The most important explanatory variable for the valuation allowance is the level of firms' tax credit and tax loss carryforwards, consistent with these items being more difficult to realize. We find little evidence that managers use the valuation allowance for earnings management purposes, although these tests may not be very powerful.

Motivated by the increasing influence of shareholder votes on corporate policies, we examine investors' perceptions of activism via voting. To identify instances of activism via voting, we focus on annual meetings with at least one ballot item where a substantial fraction of shareholders is expected to vote against management's voting recommendation, indicating an increase in their monitoring activity. We define such meetings as “contentious.” Using a sample of almost 28,000 meetings between 2003 and 2012, we examine stock returns over the period between the proxy filing and the annual meeting. This period captures when investors learn about the contentious nature of the upcoming meeting and form expectations about its likely impact on firms' policies. We find that abnormal stock returns prior to contentious meetings are significantly positive and higher than those prior to noncontentious meetings. These higher abnormal returns increase with the contentiousness of the meeting; are more pronounced in firms with poor past performance, which are more likely to respond to shareholder pressure; and persist after controlling for firm‐specific news and proxies for risk factors. Our results are consistent with investors' expecting activism via voting to have a positive impact on firm value, on average, and cast doubts on regulatory attempts to restrict the use of shareholder votes.

Regulators around the world have begun to require investment companies to provide information regarding fossil fuel investments to external stakeholders. In this paper we examine whether such disclosures impact the investment portfolios and/or investment policies of the disclosing firms. Using a 2016 California disclosure mandate that required some U.S. insurance companies to disclose their fossil fuel investments on a public website, we find the disclosing insurers reduced their fossil fuel investments by approximately 20 % relative to the non-disclosers. Despite this on-average result, we note significant variation in changes to investment portfolios. We find insurers pressured by external stakeholders, including public shareholders and environmental activists, are more likely to divest. In contrast, enhanced Californian regulatory oversight power is unrelated to divesture. Even after the disclosure mandate is reversed, we find the disclosing insurers do not revert to their pre-policy holdings of fossil fuel investments, suggesting the impact created a longer-term change in investment behavior.